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Executive Summary
In recent years, universal basic income (UBI) has moved from the fringes of academic debate to 
being mooted in mainstream forums as a serious policy proposal. This report addresses the idea’s 
remarkable rise, exploring why it has occurred; takes an objective look at the core issues relating 
to UBI’s desirability, surveying the existing theoretical and empirical literature on UBI’s likely 
effects; assesses its feasibility as a realistic proposal in the UK; and considers various options 
regarding policy design and implementation strategies. Our approach is to review existing 
literature and secondary data in combination with our own microsimulation work at the IPR 
(Martinelli, 2017a; 2017b). 
The report is structured as follows. Chapter 1 opens by defining UBI and summarising the 
theoretical and normative arguments made in favour of the policy. The second section of 
Chapter 1 provides an introduction to UBI as a family of proposals and identifies some closely 
related policies to UBI. The third section provides an overview of key contemporary debates, 
and examines the nature of the evidence on which UBI proponents and critics draw to support 
their arguments. In doing so we propose that our microsimulation work makes some important 
contributions to policy debates around basic income, in light of the absence of direct ex ante 
empirical evidence. 
In Chapter 2, we examine recent developments which suggest that UBI has risen up the policy 
agenda, and seek to understand why it has recently gained prominence. The first section of 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the recent developments that suggest UBI is experiencing a 
groundswell of popular support. The following sections examine two core (and related) reasons 
for the increased policy interest: the increasingly apparent flaws and contradictions inherent in 
the modern welfare state (second section), and ongoing changes in labour market structures 
– increasing wage polarity, the growth of precarious and insecure employment, and even the 
spectre of technological unemployment – to which UBI appears to present a solution (third 
section). We conclude that support for UBI does not rest on the more extreme theses about the 
forthcoming ‘post-work’ future but may still be justified in relation to more prosaic arguments. 
While a diverse range of groups are pressing for the change, policymakers remain rightly 
unconvinced that UBI is the optimal solution – or even an appropriate solution. The remainder 
of the report deals with the most important debates. Turning to Chapter 3, we note concerns 
from opponents across the political spectrum that UBI is unaffordable – an issue we survey in 
the first section of Chapter 3. The challenge is a complex one, going beyond a simple question 
of the fiscal resources or tax levels required to fund a UBI; it also relates intimately to the 
distributional consequences of UBI schemes paid at different levels and varying in terms of their 
interaction with existing welfare policies, issues we introduce in the second section. In other 
words, affordability and distributional effects cannot be separated; rather than claiming UBI is 
unaffordable per se, a more apt characterisation of opposition is that an affordable UBI would 
be inadequate, and an adequate UBI would be unaffordable. We assess the basis of this claim, 
looking at microsimulation studies on the fiscal and distributional implications of alternative 
UBI schemes in the UK. For schemes that aim to replace the myriad means-tested supports (‘full 
schemes’), we show that such schemes either lead to unacceptable household losses (including 
some disadvantaged groups falling deeper into poverty) or simply cost too much. We compare 
the implications of such schemes with alternatives which retain the existing array of means-
tested benefits (‘partial schemes’). We conclude that basic income policy design is subject to a 
three-way trade-off between the important goals of meeting need, controlling cost, and reducing 
the negative effects of means-testing; partial schemes are better equipped to ensure acceptable 
distributional outcomes, but fail to achieve many of UBI’s broader goals – including drastic 
reductions in bureaucratic complexity and the minimisation of poverty and unemployment traps 
– as effectively as full schemes. 
The reference to poverty and unemployment traps connects to another core issue in basic 
income policy debates (which also touches on affordability): the extent to which UBI can be 
expected to result in an expansion or a contraction of labour supply. Clearly, labour market 
exodus could render the policy unsustainable by eroding a primary source of funding (payroll 
taxes). But UBI’s labour market effects are highly contested – characterised by theoretical 
ambiguity and a relative dearth of valid empirical evidence. We examine these issues in the 
first section of Chapter 4. At issue is the relative strength of causal effects which may pull in 
different directions depending upon individual and household characteristics and the specifics 
of the UBI scheme in question. In the second section we consider UBI’s expected impact on 
pay and conditions, and its relationship with other labour market policies. Having reviewed a 
largely theoretical literature thus far, in the third section of Chapter 4 we examine empirical 
microsimulation evidence on a number of specific UBI schemes, drawing on evidence from 
Finland and the UK. We argue that partial schemes (in the sense described above) cannot 
offer the improvements in work incentives that UBI advocates promise to the same degree as 
full schemes, but that even for the latter, the majority of people would face reduced financial 
incentives to work. 
Finally, Chapter 5 tackles the thorny issues of political feasibility and implementation. In 
its first section we expound on theories of welfare reform which suggest that any ‘real world’ 
UBI scheme would necessarily build on existing policies, institutions and political economy 
structures. The second section examines the prospects for and barriers to the coalescence of 
UBI’s potential beneficiaries into meaningful constituencies and coalitions of support. In this 
context, the feasibility of different UBI proposals needs to be considered with reference to 
prevailing policy trajectories and electoral trends in the UK, as we do in the third section. While 
we cast doubt on the likelihood of a robust coalition of interests forming around any UBI paid at 
a substantial level in the UK at the present time, we note a number of possible implementation 
trajectories which appear relatively feasible under existing conditions. 
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Introduction to 
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What is UBI and What is it For?
Following the standard and commonly-accepted definition (Van 
Parijs, 1992), a universal basic income (UBI, used interchangeably 
with the terms basic income, citizen’s income and unconditional 
basic income) is a regular cash payment, paid periodically 
• To everyone within a defined political cmmunity 
• On an individual basis 
• Irrespective of the recipient’s income or wealth (i.e.   
 without means-testing) 
• Without behavioural (labour market) conditions attached
• Without reference to any prior contributions or work   
 history 
The idea of a basic income has been around for a long time. 
It is, as Van Parijs (ibid.) remarks, a “disarmingly simple idea” 
with the potential to profoundly change how we organise social 
security and the very nature of work. Thomas Paine (1737-1809) 
mooted the payment of a universal endowment in the 18th 
century, long before the modern concept of social security even 
existed, as compensation for the appropriation of the ‘commons’ 
for private gain. In the mid-20th century, economists such as 
James Tobin and Milton Friedman endorsed the concept as an 
exercise in welfare reform for reasons of economic efficiency. 
The core idea is to eliminate the need for intrusive and costly 
bureaucracy and replace (or at least supplement) a complex 
range of targeted and conditional benefits with a single, uniform 
transfer. 
Reforming social security in such a way is argued to give 
rise to numerous and significant advantages over conventional 
(means-tested, contributory and conditional) social security sys-
tems. Firstly, unlike in means-tested schemes, claimants are not 
discouraged from working by the withdrawal of benefits or the 
risk of income disruption; so-called poverty, unemployment and 
bureaucratic traps are eliminated or reduced. Secondly, there are 
no gaps in coverage – i.e. UBI provides income security to all as 
a matter of right, absent intrusive and burdensome entitlement 
conditions. While basic income security is viewed by a majority 
of the population as a normative right (ILO, 2004), as Standing 
(2005) notes, “you do not have a right if you have to do x, y and 
z in order to have an entitlement”. Thirdly, basic income allows 
individuals to balance work and family commitments more freely 
– as well as to engage in a range of socially valuable and person-
ally fulfilling activities – and facilitates their engagement in more 
flexible forms of employment. Fourthly, being individualised, 
UBI is minimally intrusive into individuals’ personal relationships, 
dispensing “with any control over living arrangements”, preserv-
ing “the full advantages of reducing the cost of one’s living by 
sharing one’s accommodation with others” (Van Parijs, 2004: 12). 
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Advocates have also sought to justify basic income in con-
nection with a range of political philosophical perspectives 
and theories of justice; an overview of libertarian, egalitarian 
and communitarian positions on basic income is provided in 
Appendix 1. Proponents thus suggest basic income is both a 
just and an economically efficient means of achieving the 
core objectives of social security: redistributing income, al-
leviating poverty, and managing risk. Goals range from prosaic 
improvements in the organisation of welfare – e.g. labour market 
activation, reduced administration costs, stigma and bureau-
cratic intrusion, and the promotion of the flexible ‘gig economy’ 
– to more profound forms of societal change – the promotion 
of gender equality via a fairer division of unpaid caring duties 
and the provision of independent incomes to women, the 
strengthening of workers’ bargaining positions vis-à-vis employ-
ers via provision of an ‘exit option’, and the ecological benefits of 
‘degrowth’ – that characterise a ‘post-productivist’ economy. 
UBI’s strengths give rise to arguments that it is well placed 
to cope with new and emerging social risks, while ensuring 
labour markets function effectively in the light of new economic 
and technological realities. The most attention-grabbing of the 
numerous justifications for UBI relate to structural changes to 
the economy. In one argument, typified by Srnicek and Williams 
(2015), the capacity for robots to replace a growing proportion of 
human labour has alarming implications that can only be miti-
gated by UBI. As Goos and Manning (2007) have demonstrated, 
technological development is associated with a polarisation 
between ‘lovely’ and ‘lousy’ jobs – so, even if predictions of the 
redundancy of human labour are unfounded, it appears reason-
able to assume that automation will continue to contribute to 
growing disparities in earning potential. A simultaneous labour 
market trend has been towards greater income insecurity 
through a gradual reduction in the proportion of permanent, 
full-time jobs (Standing, 2011). These dynamics look likely to lead 
to dislocation and economic insecurity for millions of people. UBI 
becomes a way to re-imagine society in a chronically insecure 
and/or ‘post-work’ future. 
A Family of Schemes: Varieties and Cognates of 
UBI
Although UBI has a number of core definitional attributes (as 
described above), basic income is best seen as a family of 
schemes, with variation between them in terms of a number of 
crucial design features; De Wispelaere and Stirton (2004) review 
a number of sources of variation between different forms of UBI. 
The most crucial of these are arguably the level of payment, the 
way UBI is intended to interact with other benefits (i.e. whether 
it is intended to replace or run concurrently with them) and 
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the wider constellation of labour market policies, and how it 
is funded. It is also worth noting that although coverage must 
by definition be ‘universal’, this is usually understood in the 
context of a defined population. Therefore, payments are usually 
restricted on the basis of citizenship or residency criteria, exclud-
ing foreign nationals, recently arrived migrants, and convicted 
prisoners (Van Parijs, 2004). Perhaps more pertinently, age 
criteria may be applied to delimit entitlement or vary the level 
of payments; some proposals only cover working age adults for 
example (Murray, 2006), or relate to an even more specific age 
groups such as ‘Third Age’ adults (Torry, 2013). 
These design features vary in line with the goals and objec-
tives motivating basic income; in turn, different goals and 
objectives are prioritised according to the political preferences 
of different UBI supporters. UBI supporters come from a wide 
range of political perspectives, a consequence of the breadth of 
the range of arguments on which UBI proponents draw. At UBI’s 
heart is a compromise between the ‘protective’ and ‘productive’ 
elements of social security (Hudson and Kühner, 2009) – protect-
ing against new and old social risks (Haüsermann, 2012) while 
eliminating harmful labour market distortions (Van Parijs et al., 
2000). The juxtaposition is such that basic income is argued 
to defy conventional political labels; it is ‘neither right nor left 
but forward’. A more nuanced assessment may be that whether 
it is ‘right’ or ‘left’ depends on the specifics of the scheme in 
question; an important theme of our analysis is that it may be 
impossible to achieve all of UBI’s stated objectives in a single 
scheme – as discussed below, and the political strategic conse-
quences of which we return to in 5. 
Progressive and Conservative Visions of UBI
The ‘basic’ in UBI does not imply any minimum level of payment 
or “a link with so-called basic needs… a basic income can in 
principle fall short of as well as exceed whatever level of income 
is deemed sufficient to cover a person’s basic needs” (Van Parijs, 
1992: 4). In any case, the level of income required to ensure 
an individual’s basic needs are covered is highly debateable. 
Following the Basic Income Earth Network’s definitions (BIEN, 
2017), it is helpful to distinguish between ‘full’ and ‘partial’ UBI 
schemes, with the former “high enough to be… part of a policy 
strategy to eliminate material poverty and enable the social and 
cultural participation of every individual” and the latter implying 
a more modest payment (see Standing, 2004: 19). The precise 
payment levels are not specified; as BIEN notes, “definitions of 
‘full’ and ‘partial’ are highly controversial” (BIEN, 2017). 
These definitions (of full and partial UBI) also connect to 
another important form of variation between schemes: how UBI 
is conceived to interact with the wider constellation of social 
security benefits. Clearly, ceteris paribus, the higher the level of 
payment, the stronger the rationale that it would replace, rather 
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than supplement, other benefits. Indeed, some definitions of full 
and partial UBI are explicit that the former is designed to replace 
a large number of existing benefits while a partial is designed 
to replace relatively few (Kela, 2016). Again, the exact param-
eters are not specified; full and partial are relative concepts. 
Nevertheless, it is this understanding of full and partial UBI that 
we adopt in this brief when evaluating specific schemes in Parts 
3 and 4. 
Another important area of contention is how UBI should 
relate to wider labour market policies. Some advocates of basic 
income see the policy as consistent with strong labour market 
protections such as minimum wage legislation and working 
time directives. Indeed, due to concerns that UBI could act as 
a subsidy to low wages and weaken the bargaining position 
of some workers, such wider labour protections are seen as 
even more vital (Gray, 2017). Furthermore, actualising the more 
optimal work/life balance that basic income potentiates requires 
that employers permit workers to reduce their hours – neces-
sitating flex-work regulations. Against these arguments, some 
proponents argue that basic income eliminates (or reduces) the 
need for employment protection and labour market regulation, 
as individuals have a stronger bargaining position and therefore 
greater capacity to refuse unacceptable pay and conditions in 
the first place (Groot, 2002). 
Together, these issues are highly contested. A number of 
advocates seek to demonstrate not only that a basic income is 
just, but that it should be paid at “the highest sustainable level” 
(Standing, 2004). Such a vision is motivated by a strong appetite 
for redistribution and belief that workers should be provided an 
exit option to strengthen their hand against employers1. Usually, 
advocates of generous UBI schemes – coming as they do from 
the political left – acknowledge that payments may need to 
be supplemented with extensive additional transfers, and are 
more sanguine about tax rises that might be required to pay 
for a generous UBI. They are also motivated by the desire to 
reduce harmful and intrusive conditions that are only imposed 
on the poorest in society, and to plug the gaps in the safety net 
to provide ‘substantive’ rather than purely ‘nominal’ universality. 
Progressive basic income advocates are likely to support strong 
employment protections and oppose UBI being used as a sub-
sidy to poverty wages. 
1. For example, in their article “A Capitalist Road to Communism”, Van Der Veen and Van Parijs (2006) argue that a generous 
unconditional payment would strengthen the position of the poorly paid, helping to improve conditions of work and pay 
but also serving to motivate labour market withdrawal and engagement in intrinsically fulfilling activities. Payments could 
be increased provided that total output remained sufficient to cover them. As the authors acknowledge, it would not be 
immediately possible to share the entire social product in this way, since “this would, in all likelihood, generate such a drastic 
fall in the supply of both capital and labor… that per capita income… would no longer cover fundamental needs” (ibid.: 12). 
However, as a result of continual productivity gains, “the maximum relative share of the guaranteed income increases steadily 
… [until such a point that] … all fundamental needs could sustainably be met without labour being differentially rewarded” 
(ibid.).
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At the opposite end of the spectrum, libertarian and conserva-
tive basic income advocates tend to prioritise arguments about 
reductions in administrative costs, removal of unemployment 
and poverty traps, the elimination of bureaucratic intrusion, and 
the curtailment of welfare expenditure. Controlling tax rises 
is likely to be an important motivating factor in policy design. 
Typical of this perspective would be Murray’s (2006) proposal 
which replaces most social security policies – including those 
relating to housing and health – with a single, modest payment 
for all working age adults. Because they are arguably relatively 
less concerned with reducing the burden of administration on 
claimants than they are concerned about reducing administra-
tive costs to the state, conservative and libertarian advocates 
tend to favour one of UBI’s cognates, the negative income tax 
(described below), as opposed to UBI per se; they also tend to 
be more sanguine about means-testing at the household level. 
Conservative supporters also tend to champion basic income 
being coupled with laissez-faire labour market regulations.  
 
Cognates of UBI 
 
Between the two polarised positions described above, there are 
an almost infinite number of ways to conceive of a UBI’s role in 
the welfare state. 
As well as variation between forms of basic income per se, we 
can also identify policies which fall short of conforming to the 
definition of basic income provided above, but which share per-
tinent features with basic income – such that their goals, likely 
effects and political dynamics are highly congruent with UBI. The 
most important of these ‘cognates’ of basic income are relevant 
to the extent that they provide insights that can be generalised to 
UBI ‘proper’, especially in light of the dearth of empirical evi-
dence about the latter. Perhaps more significantly, they represent 
policy options that might be seen as more immediately feasible 
steps towards the implementation of an actual UBI. 
Negative income taxes (NITs) share with UBI the goal of 
providing an unconditional minimum income floor, and have 
potentially equivalent economic effects. The important distinc-
tion is that an NIT “can determine the level of transfer to which 
a person or household is entitled (if any) only in the light of 
information about income from other sources. In this sense, the 
fundamental difference between a basic income and an NIT is 
that the former operates ex ante, whereas the latter operates 
ex post” Van Parijs (1992: 4). Thus, NIT retains a means-testing 
function. This means that the policy can be provided at much 
lower gross fiscal cost compared to the UBI since the rich do not 
receive the payment in the former case, although in reality “the 
difference in these two scenarios is only nominal and… the real 
flows of money” are identical (Honkanen, 2014). Nevertheless, 
the framing of an unconditional floor as a means-tested tax credit 
may be more politically palatable than an upfront payment to 
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rich and poor alike, but NITs would also impose greater burdens 
on claimants and reduce ‘target efficiency’ relative to ex ante 
UBI schemes. As Van Parijs (1992: 5) observes, “in the real world 
it does make a tremendous difference whether the minimum 
income guarantee is given to all ex ante, no questions asked – as 
it is under a basic income scheme – or whether it is given only to 
those who turn out to have had, or provide adequate evidence 
that they now have, an insufficient income”.
Although not a matter of definition, another difference is that 
in practice NIT schemes are usually based on minimum income 
calculated at the household level (i.e. dependent on household 
composition) and therefore do not conform to the criterion that 
UBI should be an individualised payment. Because this should 
reduce the payment levels required to achieve a given standard 
of living – by exploiting the economies of scale that arise from 
sharing living costs – minimum income schemes often depart 
from UBI in this respect. The downside is that household-level 
schemes require another layer of bureaucratic intrusion that 
can distort coupling and family decisions in damaging ways (as 
discussed in Chapter 2). 
Earned income tax credit (EITC) schemes are another relation 
to UBI schemes. They differ from NITs in that they are only paid to 
those in work, as well as being means-tested. As an in-work ben-
efit or employment subsidy, they are intended to simultaneously 
reduce unemployment traps that arise from the steep withdrawal 
rates in means-tested out-of-work benefits, as well as alleviating 
poverty for individuals with inadequate wages (De Beer, 2000; 
Van Parijs et al., 2000). EITC schemes can be individualised or 
calculated at the household level (Van Parijs, 2004). Like NITs, 
they imply lower gross fiscal costs compared to an equivalent 
UBI, but may to a greater degree contribute to suppressed 
wages, thus undermining their effectiveness as a poverty allevia-
tion tool (see Chapter 4). 
Another close relation of basic income is the participation 
income, which relaxes the ‘no behavioural conditions’ criterion 
(Atkinson, 1996). However, the conditions are much less restric-
tive than those implied by standard labour market activation 
policies, and incorporate approved socially-valuable activities 
such as education, volunteering and care. Atkinson’s proposal 
is motivated by opposition to free-riding, which threatens the 
ethical desirability and the political feasibility of unconditional 
policies. However, it is open to the charge that it would be 
administratively cumbersome and excessively intrusive (De 
Wispelaere and Stirton, 2007). 
Unconditional cash transfers – which are becoming more 
prevalent across the developing world – may also be seen as 
sharing important features with UBI. Such schemes may fall short 
of universal coverage, but are unconditional in behavioural terms 
and may not be explicitly means-tested – instead being targeted 
at demographic groups at high risk of poverty (Standing, 2008). 
A final policy option worth mentioning here relates to ongoing 
“in practice NIT 
schemes are usually 
based on minimum 
income calculated 
at the household 
level (i.e. dependent 
on household 
composition) 
and therefore do 
not conform to 
the criterion that 
UBI should be an 
individualised 
payment”
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moves towards benefit standardisation and risk re-categori-
sation (Clasen and Clegg, 2012). The former refers to reducing 
the role of prior contribution histories in the determination of 
benefit entitlements: the erosion of the insurance principle 
and the dualisation of labour market protections that arise. The 
latter refers to erosion of differences between the ways specific 
types of claimants are treated, in terms of payment generosity 
and the imposition of conditions. In both cases, parallels can 
be made with the design features and goals of UBI as a uniform, 
non-contributory payment made to all existing claimants (and 
non-claimants) alike.
Assessing the Case for a UBI in the UK
Controversies and Debates 
 
In recent years, UBI has shot rapidly up the policy agenda, with 
growing levels of public awareness and support. In light of these 
developments, a number of arguments suggest that UBI’s rise is 
all but inevitable, due to tensions and contradictions at the heart 
of the modern welfare state, and profound transformations shak-
ing up the labour market. The nature and significance of these 
developments are the first issues addressed in this report; in 
Chapter 2, we assess whether UBI is indeed an idea whose time 
has come and whether events are pushing inexorably towards 
UBI as an essential part of any solution to insecurity, inequality 
and unemployment with which existing systems of social secu-
rity are simply ill-equipped to cope. 
Notwithstanding the theoretical advantages of basic income, 
there are a number of serious objections and counter-arguments 
in terms of UBI’s desirability and feasibility. Desirability refers to 
the extent to which universal basic income has what Van Parijs 
(1990) terms ‘ethical value’ and ‘economic value’ – relating to the 
qualities of justice and efficiency respectively. Feasibility encom-
passes both whether basic income is achievable in the sense 
that it could gain sufficient traction in the political sphere and 
fit into existing institutional structures, and whether it is viable 
in the sense that, once implemented, the policy would cohere 
with its stated objectives (De Wispelaere and Noguera, 2012). In 
the present brief, we use the term feasibility largely in the former 
sense of prospective achievability. Of course, desirability and 
feasibility are intricately linked. If basic income is undesirable – 
for example, appearing ethically unjust to many people – then it 
is unlikely to be politically achievable. Nevertheless, we retain the 
analytical distinction between desirability and feasibility because 
it is possible that a given policy may be highly desirable but 
not feasible; even among proponents we encounter scepticism 
about the political prospects for the implementation of basic 
income. 
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Indeed, universal basic income attracts enthusiastic support, 
but also fervent opposition. In some ways this is unsurprising; the 
profound theoretical arguments in favour of UBI are achieved by 
way of a radical departure from established norms of reciprocity 
and notions of citizenship rights that is sure to disquiet a great 
many people. Indeed, some of the hostility towards UBI is based 
on normative opposition to its unconditional nature, and associ-
ated issues of justice and fairness. In other words, the objection 
is that UBI breaks entirely the foundational bonds between social 
security protection, labour market effort and desert, allowing 
the hypothetical ‘lazybones’ to free-ride on the contributions of 
others. The other main objection is that a uniform benefit is at 
best an inefficient way to alleviate poverty, and at worst one that 
will leave many of the most disadvantaged poorer than before. 
In both cases it is seen as morally wrong to give payments to 
rich and poor alike. Thus UBI is criticised for severing the link 
between social protection and need as well. 
Both of these two fundamental objections are prevalent from 
the right to the left of the political spectrum. Left-wing critics of 
basic income believe that welfare should be generously available 
for all, and those on the right that it should be a residual safety 
net – but both agree that the right to an income comes with a 
responsibility to work. And critics of both persuasions agree that 
payments should be proportional to need – whether conceptu-
alised in relative or absolute terms – not uniform. To the extent 
that we are interested in the political feasibility of basic income, 
the subject of Chapter 5 of this report, we are interested too in 
arguments about its normative appeal or otherwise. 
In any case, these normative issues are closely associated 
with concerns about UBI’s economic impacts which may, in 
principle, be settled with reference to empirical evidence. Two 
overarching concerns in this regard are that basic income would 
either be unaffordable (at any level worthy of implementation) 
or would give rise to unacceptable rises in poverty, and that it 
would lead to widespread contractions in labour supply. These 
concerns are addressed in Chapters 3 and 4 respectively.  
 
The Nature of the Evidence 
 
One of the most interesting and challenging aspects of the 
debate over the advantages and disadvantages of UBI is that 
there is very little direct empirical evidence of UBI on which we 
can draw. Furthermore, the evidence that is available is limited 
in terms of lessons that can be applied to assessing the case for 
a UBI in the UK, either because the policy in question is too far 
removed from what we consider to be a real basic income, or 
because the context in which it has been implemented or trialled 
is too dissimilar to that of the UK. 
The only policies that conform to the definition of UBI, and 
that have entered into legislation and been implemented, are 
the Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend (Widerquist and Howard, 
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2012a; 2012b) and Iran’s price subsidy reform (Tabatabai, 2012). 
But due to their distinctive financing arrangements and their low 
and fluctuating value of payments, and their idiosyncratic goals 
(De Wispelaere, 2016a; Zelleke, 2012), these policies diverge 
from how UBI is usually conceptualised; evidence of their effects 
is unlikely to be transferrable to the contexts in which we are 
interested here. 
While the picture that emerges from the experience of these 
‘fully-implemented’ but highly partial UBI schemes is of relatively 
limited value to mainstream debates, there are a number of 
sources of experimental evidence to which basic income schol-
ars can point to support (or refute) their contentions about the 
policy’s effects, with more experiments ongoing or in the plan-
ning stages.  
 
Historic North American Experiments  
 
Probably the most important source of evidence on basic 
income’s likely effects are a number of negative income tax 
experiments carried out in the US and Canada between 1968 
and 1980. Within a number of communities across the US and 
in Manitoba, Canada, households were randomly selected to 
receive a guaranteed minimum income. The policies under 
examination differed from UBI ‘proper’ (as defined above) in 
that payments were calculated at the household level (i.e. they 
were not individualised) and payment was made after assess-
ment of income shortfall, not upfront (i.e. they were a negative 
income tax). In this sense, payments were restricted to ‘poor’ 
households. But in common with UBI, recipients were not subject 
to behavioural or work history requirements. Aside from the 
difference in mechanism, it has been demonstrated that negative 
income taxes should have equivalent distributional effects to a 
basic income when paid at a certain level and combined with an 
appropriate tax rate. 
Through comparison with control group outcomes, the aim 
of the experiments was mainly to examine labour market effects, 
but indicators relating to health, education and social cohesion 
were also analysed (Hum and Simpson, 1993; Widerquist, 2005). 
The findings of the hundreds of papers that the experiments 
spawned can hardly be touched upon here, but overall there was 
a small but significant drop in labour market activity, especially 
for women. In addition to this, based on until-recently-forgotten 
archives of data from the Manitoba experiments, Forget (2011) 
found evidence of a number of positive effects relating to indica-
tors of welfare and well-being, including significant drops in 
hospital admissions and mental health complaints. We discuss 
the relevance of these insights below and return to them in 
Chapter 4, in our discussion of UBI’s effects on labour market 
participation. 
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Recent and Ongoing Experiments in Developing Countries 
 
There have also been a number of recent experiments in devel-
oping countries (Namibia and India), with two more ongoing 
(Kenya and Uganda). Again, it seems likely that the evidence 
generated by these experiments would be at best only partly 
applicable to the UK context. Nevertheless, it is important to 
recognise that the studies have been lauded as having a number 
of successful outcomes. 
In Namibia, in 2008 and 2009 an experiment was carried out 
by the Basic Income Guarantee Coalition, an NGO. One village 
was selected and all residents under 60 – around 1,000 people 
– were paid approximately US$15 per month for two years, 
conforming to the UBI criteria defined above. Researchers noted 
a number of positive outcomes – reductions in poverty levels 
plus positive effects for health, education, crime, entrepreneurial 
activity, and gender equality (Haarmann et al., 2009). 
Several years later, in 2011 and 2012, another genuine basic 
income experiment was carried out, this time in India. This was a 
larger study and had a much more robust experimental design, 
with data collected through a variety of surveys carried out 
by the Indian Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA) and 
UNICEF. Eight villages were selected at random for treatment, 
and outcomes compared with 12 control villages. In total, around 
5,000 people were paid a basic income for 18 months. As in 
Namibia, researchers found a range of positive outcomes in rela-
tion to socioeconomic indicators such as household debt levels, 
health, and gender equality (Davala et al., 2015). 
In Kenya, an even larger and long-term experiment is being 
carried out by another NGO, Give Directly. The researchers are 
examining the effects of unconditional payments on 40 villages 
and over 26,000 individuals, over both long- (12 year) and short-
term (2 year) impact periods. The experiment started in October 
2016. In Uganda an experiment has just been launched by the 
Belgian NGO Eight; 50 households in one village are to receive 
€8 per week (for household comprising one adult and two 
children) (McFarland, 2017).  
 
Ongoing and Upcoming Experiments in High-Income 
Countries 
 
Perhaps the most promising form of empirical evidence is the 
flurry of experiments being carried out or entering advanced 
planning stages in a number of mature welfare states. Most 
prominent (and advanced in their implementation) among these 
are those in Finland, the Netherlands and Canada, with some 
very tentative moves towards planning a pilot also occurring in 
Scotland (ibid.). 
In January 2017, the Finnish government launched a much-
anticipated experiment into the effects of UBI. Initiated by the 
incoming prime minister in 2015, the experiment was motivated 
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by an avowed desire to explore options for making social secu-
rity more attuned to contemporary patterns of work and less 
bureaucratic, as well as to reduce poverty and unemployment 
traps (Kangas et al., 2017). A consortium of research institutions, 
coordinated by the Finnish social security organisation Kela, 
were charged with planning and running the experiment, the 
objective of which is to “estimate the causal effect of a basic 
income scheme on outcomes” (Kela, 2016: 11).
While the Finnish experiment has been implemented ‘top-
down’ from the Prime Minister’s Office, the Dutch experiments 
have been driven by devolved city-level administrations, partly as 
a result of their opposition to the central government’s approach 
to welfare and conditionality. This reflects a more general trend 
of interest in UBI and cognates within devolved regional and 
municipal authorities. In 2015, the government implemented leg-
islation to make job search conditionality more stringent. Around 
30 Dutch municipalities – with Utrecht, Tilburg, Wageningen and 
Groningen the most advanced in their efforts – are exploiting a 
‘loophole’ in the new legislation (article 83 on innovation) “which 
allows room for experimentation” (Groot and Verlaat, 2016: 3). 
There were a diverse range of proposed schemes, but among 
them were basic income-type schemes in which conditions 
are removed entirely, and in which the high withdrawal rates of 
existing means-tested benefits are reduced.
While the details of the Dutch experiments are (at the time 
of writing) still tentative, the Canadian province of Ontario has 
recently announced more definite plans to trial UBI (Bennett, 
2017). While the experiment will not test the effects of a truly 
universal UBI – it is intended to target poor households only – 
there is no limit to the amount of additional income recipients 
can earn, unlike in the Netherlands. Additional earnings will 
be subject to a marginal tax rate of 50%, much lower than the 
marginal withdrawal rates associated with most means-tested 
benefit. However, the experiment departs from UBI because it 
is not individualised; single people will receive up to C$17,000 
and couples C$24,000. The process has been informed by a 
consultation document written by a longstanding conservative 
basic income scholar (Segal, 2016). Although the precise details 
of the experimental design are still pending, the experiment has 
a budget of C$50million and will cover 4,000 households for a 
period of three years. 
National and regional authorities are not the only actors 
interested in conducting experiments in high-income countries. 
The head of the technology start-up firm Y-Combinator, Sam 
Altman, has founded a research group to design and implement 
a basic income experiment in California (McFarland, 2017).  
 
The Value of and Limits to Experimental Evidence 
 
Policy experiments are important for several reasons: they give 
us important information about the effects of implementing 
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basic income on which theoretical evidence is highly ambiguous 
(for example, on disputed labour market behavioural effects and 
on various indicators of social welfare). Trials are also invaluable 
in uncovering implementation issues not predicted by theory, 
and thus in fine-tuning the detail of policies before full imple-
mentation. Perhaps of equal importance, they also have ‘political 
demonstration effects’, raising public awareness and overcoming 
objections by demonstrating impacts (De Wispelaere, 2016b). 
Nevertheless, the aforementioned experiments are only 
of limited value in assessing the case for UBI in the UK (and 
indeed elsewhere) for several reasons. Firstly there are a host 
of methodological problems that mean that, to varying extents, 
these experiments fall short of the evidential requirements of 
the ‘gold standard’ of randomised control trials (for example 
see Osterkamp, 2013, on the Namibian experiment). More 
generally, the durations of the experiments have tended to be 
insufficient to observe long-term effects, and it is likely that 
individuals act differently in relation to experiments compared 
to fully-implemented policies. Even putting these issues aside 
for the moment, the external validity of the insights of these 
experiments is limited by the fact that either or both of the 
policy under examination and the background context in 
which it is being implemented are too dissimilar to draw any 
really useful conclusions about how concrete proposals for basic 
income would work in the UK context. Perhaps most obviously, 
experiments taking place in developing countries proceed in 
an entirely different institutional context, as well as implying 
very low-level benefits (even as a percentage of average local 
income). The historic US and Canadian experiments – probably 
still the most reliable source of data on basic income’s likely 
behavioural effects – are negative income tax schemes paid at 
the household level. They are also now several decades old, and 
took place in labour market conditions that differ significantly 
from those prevailing in the UK and at the present day. 
Ongoing and upcoming experiments are likely to be limited 
in other ways. In Finland, it became apparent that it would not 
be possible to experiment with tax changes that would form 
the basis of ‘revenue-neutral’ costed schemes. In essence, the 
Finnish Tax Administration did not have the capacity to set up 
a range of systems in time for the purpose of the experiments 
(Kela, 2016: 52). Therefore, the simultaneous effects of tax chang-
es that might occur concurrently with the implementation of UBI 
are not evaluated. Furthermore, the sample is not truly universal, 
being restricted to unemployed recipients of means-tested social 
assistance; a UBI of approximately €560 per month is being paid 
to 2,000 participants in place of the existing payments (Kangas 
et al., 2017). 
In the Netherlands, experiments are unlikely to live up to their 
early promise. The experiments are restricted in the same way as 
in the Finnish case – being limited to existing welfare recipients, 
and thus falling short of universality. But in addition, the central 
“There are a host 
of methodological 
problems that mean 
that, to varying 
extents, these 
experiments fall 
short of the evidential 
requirements of the 
‘gold standard’ of 
randomised control 
trials”
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government has intervened to restrict the scientific scope of the 
experiments, insisting upon some troubling design features for 
political reasons (Barnhoorn, 2016). The most important of these 
is that, whereas the original proposal was that participants could 
maintain all of their additional earnings (subject to income tax), 
the central government decided that they were restricted to 
retain 50% of additional earnings up to a maximum of €199 (en-
suring their total combined income remains less than someone 
would earn working full-time at minimum wage), thus contradict-
ing one of UBI’s core principles. 
Finally, even if we are able to observe – reliably – the impacts 
of a policy, find that the effects are positive, and generalise the 
findings to another context, experiments such as these do not 
offer any way of weighing up beneficial impacts (relating to 
improved income security) against UBI’s fiscal costs (and against 
the costs and benefits of alternative policies). It is hardly surpris-
ing that giving people money would have a number of positive 
impacts; the question is whether UBI is a good use of funds. 
Although to varying degrees they might still generate 
important data on the effects of the removal of conditions and 
high withdrawal rates on employment transitions, these types 
of experiment are unable to tell us much about the more holistic 
effects of ‘UBI-proper’ in the UK, since they do not test for the 
crucial effects of accompanying tax changes, nor examine how 
changes in income and behavioural responses would be distrib-
uted across different demographic groups in the case of a truly 
universal payment.  
 
The Microsimulation Approach 
 
Fortunately, these are questions to which microsimulation 
methods can readily be applied. Microsimulation is a common 
approach to evaluating the effects of tax and benefit reforms 
with respect to fiscal implications, distributional effects, and (less 
commonly) impacts on static work incentives. Recently, the basic 
income debate has moved to address issues relating to policy 
design and the relative merits of different types of UBI scheme, to 
which microsimulation approaches are particularly well-suited. 
Advances in computing power combined with the availability 
of large, representative income surveys make it possible to 
compare outcomes of the prevailing ‘base’ policy environment 
with other hypothetical policy systems. This means that we have 
much greater capacity to assess and compare large numbers of 
different permutations of UBI. 
Because it models the effects of policy reforms over a repre-
sentative sample, microsimulation enables researchers to draw 
an accurate picture of overall impacts on government revenue, 
the income distribution and the distribution of financial incen-
tives to work at the national level. In Chapter 3 of this report, we 
summarise and review the IPR’s own studies (Martinelli, 2017a 
and 2017b) and those carried out by other scholars (Torry, 2016a; 
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Reed and Lansley, 2016). In combination, these studies offers 
important insights into the trade-offs between the objectives and 
probable impacts of alternative (full and partial) schemes. We 
must note that a major shortcoming of this type of analysis is that 
it assumes no behavioural change (e.g. labour market response). 
This seems unrealistic in the context of such a wide-ranging 
reform as the implementation of a universal basic income, 
especially one paid at a generous level. For these reasons, micro-
simulation evidence should be complemented with theoretical 
modelling, ex-post analysis of observed behavioural responses, 
and microsimulation of static work incentives. In Chapter 4, we 
summarise the secondary literature on UBI’s likely effects on 
labour market participation, and review the results of our own 
(Martinelli, 2017b) and others’ (Kangas et al., 2017) microsimula-
tion studies into UBI’s effects on financial work incentives in the 
UK and Finnish contexts respectively. 
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Evidence of Increased Interest and Support in the 
UK and Beyond
In the past few decades, waves of interest in the idea of UBI have 
waxed and subsequently waned. But there is a sense in which the 
recent resurgence of interest is more intense, and support more 
ardent, broad-based, and secure. What is the basis for such a 
claim?
Increased media and public scrutiny is one element. In 
2013, there was a successful Swiss ‘popular initiative’ to hold a 
referendum on whether to grant every citizen an unconditional 
monthly payment. In the wake of the news, press coverage of 
the basic income idea increased exponentially, with (broadly) 
favourable coverage in such publications as The Guardian and 
The Independent in the UK, and The New York Times and The Wall 
Street Journal in the US. While the Swiss motion was defeated 
comfortably when the referendum took place in June 2016, it 
contributed hugely to increased media attention and public 
awareness. 
Another important set of events that both reflect and motivate 
greater public and media interest in basic income are decisions 
to carry out (or at least, seriously examine the practicalities 
of carrying out) UBI experiments in a number of high-income 
countries, as discussed in Chapter 1. Of course, whether all of the 
proposed trials will take place is unclear; what is important is that 
they indicate that the debate has reached ‘mainstream’ policy 
circles – where there is now, at the very least, growing appetite 
for further investigation.  
 
Increased Support from a Broad Range of Sources 
 
Another element is the growing membership – and sheer number 
– of organisations supportive of (or at least interested in) the 
idea of UBI. These new sources of support and increased interest 
stem largely from perceptions that existing systems of social 
security are not fit for purpose, in the light of ongoing socio-
economic transformations including labour market change. The 
interest includes a diversity of political and civil society collec-
tives and has come from across the political spectrum. UBI’s 
most staunch and consistent supporters have traditionally been 
found within Green and minor left-leaning political parties (Groot 
and Van Der Veen, 2000). Indeed, the UK’s Green Party has con-
sistently incorporated basic income into its election manifestos, 
and has done so again in 2017 (Green Party, 2017). Other minor 
parties firmly in favour of basic income include the Icelandic 
Pirate Party and the single issue Bündnis Grundeinkommen 
(“Basic Income League”) in Germany. 
Traditional social democratic parties, with their ‘labourist’ 
ideals and backgrounds entrenched in organised labour move-
ments, have typically eschewed UBI, while conservative parties 
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have been even more reticent. An interesting development in 
this regard is that in Finland, UBI has been pushed onto the policy 
agenda by the centre-right coalition government (Kalliomaa-Puha 
et al., 2016). The Socialist candidate for the French Presidency, 
Benoit Hamon, was a vocal supporter of basic income. In the UK, 
the idea has recently attracted support from the Trades Union 
Congress (TUC), and the progressive Royal Society for the Arts 
(RSA) and Compass think-tanks, with the latter contributing 
important work into the financial and distributional feasibility of 
a number of basic income schemes (Reed and Lansley, 2016). 
The free market think-tank The Adam Smith Institute also sup-
ports a negative income tax form of basic income. The Work and 
Pensions Select Committee – as well as the Scottish Parliament’s 
Social Security Committee and a Labour Party working group – 
have recently convened expert meetings to examine the case for 
UBI. This would have been unthinkable a few short years ago, and 
is suggestive of UBI’s broad-based appeal. 
Alongside these developments, there has recently been an 
explosion of interest within the technology sector (Sadowski, 
2016). This interest appears to have arisen in response to features 
of UBI relating to its suitability for new patterns of work driven by, 
and involved in the generation of, technological developments. 
In the case of the former, online platforms such as Uber underpin 
the so-called ‘gig economy’. The operators of such platforms – 
and their workforces – would benefit from a basic unconditional 
income floor; it would enable employees to accept more flexible 
but insecure working patterns. Those involved in the production 
of digital technologies (the archetypal Silicon Valley program-
mer) also see the value in UBI. The technology industry is driving 
the digitisation and automation of routine human activities, 
with the potential (in principle) to shed large numbers of jobs. 
As discussed further below, this is one of the core reasons that 
interest in basic income has been growing; UBI is seen as an 
essential aspect of the maintenance of public acceptance for 
such changes. 
A final development worthy of note is appetite for UBI and 
related policies within the social protection and international 
development communities. The World Bank and other main-
stream development institutions now promote cash transfers as 
a core element of the social protection agenda, and have begun 
to explore the strengths of unconditional schemes (Baird et al., 
2010; Golan et al., 2015; Haushofer and Shapiro, 2016). In India, 
motivated by the sheer number and complexity of poverty alle-
viation schemes and programmes (over 950 financed by central 
government alone) and their huge cost (approximately 5% of 
GDP), the government is investigating the practical feasibilities of 
UBI and cognate policies (Government of India, 2017).
To the extent that these varied developments suggest that 
a shift in UBI’s fortunes is underway, why has this occurred? We 
need to distinguish proximate causes (such as interest in the 
Swiss referendum and forthcoming policy experiments) from 
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more fundamental, structural forces. Clearly, announcements of 
pilots and referenda in recent years have contributed to the flurry 
of media and public interest – and vice versa, the two factors 
reinforcing one another. But this doesn’t explain why they have 
happened in the first place – and why now. 
Arguably, in seeking structural causes of basic income’s 
rise, we can identify a number of related phenomena. One set 
of important factors relates to the emergence of a number of 
challenges to both the efficacy and the public acceptance of tra-
ditional modes of social security. Another set relates to a number 
of labour market changes – including automation – which are 
contributing to polarisation of wages and driving concerns about 
technological unemployment. Under the category of labour 
market change we must also consider arguments that suggest 
that work is growing increasingly insecure in character. 
A second question relates to the significance of all these 
developments, and of their fundamental structural drivers. Does 
increased interest and attention really signify a shift from ‘pipe-
dream’ to ‘serious political proposal’? Certainly, we are seeing 
the investment of real political capital in a number of important 
respects. But are moves towards basic income all but inevitable, 
as some proponents claim, given the likely continuance of exist-
ing trends? On this, we must be more circumspect; as discussed 
below, there are still a number of significant political barriers for 
UBI to overcome and a number of alternative scenarios that may 
yet emerge in opposition to basic income’s apparently inexorable 
rise.
Welfare States in Crisis
The ‘welfare state’ is usually seen as having arisen from a particu-
lar set of economic, social and political developments that are 
broadly common to high-income developed countries in Europe 
and North America; these include industrialisation, political 
modernisation, and demographic and labour market changes 
(Pierson, C., 1998: 12-13). After the Second World War until 
roughly the mid-1970s – the so-called Golden Age – European 
welfare states experienced the institutionalisation of increasingly 
comprehensive and generous forms of welfare provision. This 
expansion took place under socio-economic circumstances in 
which sustained economic growth, full (male) employment (ena-
bled by Keynesian demand management), and stable nuclear 
families were the norm. In other words, conditions were such 
that families’ welfare needs were reasonably well-met through 
wage income – which was expected to be sufficient to cover a 
breadwinner’s dependents – with contributory benefits covering 
the periods in which he was unable to work as a result of involun-
tary (frictional) unemployment, incapacity or old age. As a result 
of labour market and demographic factors, these contingencies 
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were relatively rare and/or short in duration – on average, at 
least – compared to the offsetting contributions histories. As Van 
Parijs et al. (2000: 53) observe, “the resulting pattern of distribu-
tion seemed to be on the right track so long as access to a job 
and the entitlements associated with it… were secured to the 
overwhelming majority of households”. 
This is no longer the case. Since the 1980s, there have been 
reports that the welfare state is ‘in crisis’, for the first time be-
coming “the object of doubts, fundamental critique, and political 
conflict” (Offe, 1984: 147-8). Offe’s analysis distinguishes critiques 
emanating from the right and left of the political spectrum. In 
the case of the former, welfare is the cause of dependency and 
societal breakdown, reducing incentives to work and save, and 
discouraging family formation. The welfare bureaucracy required 
to administer social security is further argued to be bloated and 
intrusive. This type of argument has been extremely influential in 
shifting public opinion and driving policy reform in the UK (Dean 
and Taylor-Gooby, 2014). 
In the case of the critique from the left, the system is seen 
as incapable to satisfy unmet needs in the context of the emer-
gence of ‘new social risks’ (Bonoli, 2005). These new risks, for 
which traditional systems of social security appear increasing 
ill-equipped, include lone parenthood, reconciling work and 
family life in the context of increases in female employment, and 
long-term unemployment and poverty wages arising from skill 
deficits and labour market change.  
 
Permanent Austerity and Creeping Conditionality 
 
Critiques from the right and left have created a difficult environ-
ment in which to implement social security reforms. At the 
aggregate level, each critique appears to carry diametrically 
opposed policy implications – retrenchment versus expansion of 
social security. In fact, both critiques contribute to considerable 
strain on existing welfare arrangements, and give rise to pressure 
for fundamental reform. 
It is a core claim of its proponents that basic income can help 
to alleviate both sets of concerns – that social security is both 
inadequate for meeting need and that it gives rise to harmful 
distortions in labour market and other behavioural incentives. 
How have policymakers dealt with the aforementioned tensions 
and contradictions in practice? While it is important to note 
that responses have varied across and within different welfare 
‘regimes’, nevertheless we can point to some general trends. 
As Pierson (2011) observes, “all of these emerging or newly-
salient risks create potential demand for public expenditure. 
They are, in this sense, competitors for scarce resources with 
already-established social programs”. As a result of these and 
other developments (see Gilbert, 2002), welfare states have 
faced budgetary pressures for over four decades – what Paul 
Pierson (1998) has called “permanent austerity”. In combination, 
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these pressures have led to the proliferation of what Haüsermann 
(2012: 113) terms ‘new social policies’, which comprise trans-
fers for new categories of claimant or ‘risk group’ but also, 
importantly, policies relating to labour market activation and 
employability. 
According to the OECD (2017a), in general coverage of 
(relatively generous) social insurance schemes has become 
increasingly threadbare (although remaining more prevalent in 
continental Europe compared with the UK). Social assistance 
programmes pick up the slack – in the UK, the proportion of 
benefit expenditure devoted to means-tested benefits for non-
pensioners has risen from 24% to 79% between 1978 and 2013 
(Hood and Oakley, 2014) – with the caveat that they are less 
generous, give rise to perverse incentives, and are limited in 
substantive coverage due to the imposition of tests and punitive 
conditions that accompany payments. 
As Painter and Thuong (2015: 15) observe, “essentially, the 
system has faced a legitimacy crisis of declining public sup-
port – and in many respects still does so. This has led to series of 
incremental reforms under the banner of ‘conditionality’”. Thus 
in the UK, in the past decades, we have seen the expansion of 
in-work benefits and coverage of new risk groups such as lone 
parents and carers, alongside the introduction of increasingly 
stringent eligibility restrictions, punitive welfare administration 
and decreased generosity of payments (Dwyer, 2004). According 
to the Joseph Rowntree Foundation (2014), labour market con-
ditionality and associated sanctions regimes – which have been 
extended to previously exempt groups such as lone parents 
and disabled people – have pushed large numbers of vulner-
able people into extreme hardship as well as causing profound 
anxiety. At the same time, there are question marks around the 
effectiveness of conditionality in terms of activating individuals 
into stable and well-paid jobs (ibid.). The twin policy dynamics of 
permanent austerity and creeping conditionality thus further 
erode the capacity of the system to adequately alleviate poverty 
and reduce inequality while ensuring the human dignity of 
welfare recipients. More recently welfare states across the world 
have also had to contend with the effects of the ‘Great Recession’ 
(Hemerijck et al., 2012). This has exacerbated pressure for 
retrenchment amidst greater need for social security to alleviate 
poverty in the context of higher unemployment and – in the 
case of the UK – declining real wages and rising wage inequality 
(Gregg et al., 2014).  
 
Enter Basic Income?  
 
In the context of these profound and varied problems, UBI’s 
objectives include: 
• The dramatic simplification of existing rules and condi-
tions, both to reduce administrative costs and – perhaps 
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more importantly – to reduce the psychological burden 
and stigma associated with complex and intrusive rules 
and conditions.
• More comprehensive coverage of the population, and 
thus more effective alleviation of poverty and greater 
levels of income security. 
• The elimination (or reduction) of poverty, unemployment 
and bureaucracy traps that discourage welfare recipients 
from engaging or advancing in the labour market, as 
described below. 
The Alleviation of Poverty, Unemployment and Bureaucracy 
Traps under UBI
Key to understanding UBI’s likely labour market effects are two 
important measures of financial work incentives: the participa-
tion tax rate (PTR) and the marginal effective tax rate (METR). The 
PTR measures the proportion of gross earnings lost through tax 
and/or benefit withdrawal while the METR measures the propor-
tion of each additional unit of earned income lost to tax and/or 
benefit withdrawal. High PTRs and METRs rates lead to unem-
ployment and poverty traps: these describe situations in which 
people face little incentive to enter employment, or to progress 
in work or increase their work effort, respectively. 
In the UK, those in receipt of means-tested benefits routinely 
face effective marginal tax rates in excess of 90% (Brewer et 
al., 2010: 92); after a small ‘disregard’, benefits such as Income 
Support and Jobseeker’s Allowance are withdrawn pound for 
pound. Although in-work benefits such as Working Tax Credit 
mitigate against unemployment traps and encourage labour 
market participation, they create poverty traps due to high 
withdrawal rates further up the income distribution (Brewer et al. 
(ibid.) report marginal rates of 73.4%).
The implementation of a non-withdrawable basic income – 
partly or fully in replacement of means-tested support – would 
tend to increase the incentives for inactive individuals to enter 
paid employment, since there would be a significant positive 
return to employment at any wage rate, for any number of hours, 
and of any contractual duration. Even if the person continued 
to receive means-tested support on top of their UBI, due to the 
lower payment they would be able to escape extremely high 
METRs more easily by earning smaller amounts of additional 
income. 
Compounding the problem of weak financial incentives in 
highly conditional systems are so-called ‘bureaucratic traps’, 
which describe situations in which claimants are reluctant to 
enter employment due to uncertainty about how the change of 
circumstance will affect their benefits – even when the change of 
circumstance should result in a financial improvement. 
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Basic Income and the ‘New Social Question’ 
 
Basic income has long been supported on the basis that it is a 
way to overcome a ‘new social question’ consisting of “a growing 
number of households… unable to secure access to adequate 
job assets” (Van Parijs et al., 2000: 54). Following Offe (2008), 
it is possible that wages may be too low to provide adequate 
income for workers and the dependent members of their house-
holds, or too high in the sense that they reduce the demand 
for labour below that required to achieve full employment (i.e. 
the level of employment at which everyone who wishes to work 
at the prevailing wage rate can do so). Indeed, the ‘new social 
question’ arises in the somewhat nightmarish circumstance in 
which the two problems can occur simultaneously: inadequate 
wages for low-skilled workers go hand in hand with high levels 
of unemployment. Basic income can tackle the dual problems 
of inadequate wages and high unemployment in ways that 
conventional social security cannot. As well as a conventional 
wage-replacement benefit for the unemployed, UBI can serve 
simultaneously as an in-work benefit – providing additional 
income to low paid workers, without discouraging work through 
poverty and unemployment traps – and as a chosen-time sub-
sidy – permitting those who are so inclined to reduce their work 
effort or exit the labour market entirely, freeing up jobs for the 
involuntarily unemployed: the so-called ‘reshuffle effect’ (Groot 
and Van Der Veen, 2000). 
 
Labour Market flexibility and Post-Productivist Welfare 
 
Providing a secure unconditional income floor both encourages 
and enables individuals to take insecure and short-term (but po-
tentially highly rewarding) jobs in the ‘gig economy’, and by the 
same token promotes entrepreneurship, creativity and innova-
tion as captured by Bregman’s (2017) conceptualisation of UBI as 
‘venture capital for people’. These features are especially desir-
able given ongoing labour market changes, as discussed below. 
Basic income may permit individuals to exit the labour market 
temporarily to engage in training activities, or it could facilitate 
lower-paid (but more promising) labour market activities such 
as apprenticeships. Clearly, these features have the potential to 
increase the flexibility and thus improve the performance of the 
labour market at the macro level as well as carrying benefits for 
individuals. Another way in which UBI interacts with the labour 
market is in its potential to increase the bargaining power of 
workers vis-à-vis employers. The extent to which basic income 
truly improves workers’ bargaining position with respect to their 
wages and conditions is analysed in Chapter 4. 
Increased bargaining power relates to the idea that basic 
income provides a full or partial exit option from employment. 
As suggested above, permitting full-time workers to reduce 
their labour effort frees up opportunities for the un- and 
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under-employed. But the benefits extend beyond those relating 
to the more efficient functioning of the labour market. Breaking 
the link between labour and financial compensation serves to 
promote the legitimacy and importance of all other forms of 
work which are currently uncompensated (Standing, 2013). 
Forms of work which may be under-valued from a societal 
perspective include caring for children and elderly relatives 
and engaging in voluntary and charitable service. In this sense, 
basic income may be seen as the basis of an emergent ‘post-
productivist’ welfare regime in so far as it affords greater priority 
to “individual autonomy in […] welfare and labour market ar-
rangements” and rejects the valorisation of labour (Van Der Veen 
and Groot, 2006: 595). By the same token, some ‘green’ activists 
promote UBI as a way to simultaneously promote ‘degrowth’ (by 
reducing the material incentives for production and economic 
growth) at the same time as mitigating any adverse distributive 
effects (Birnbaum, 2010; Andersson, 2010). 
 
The Promotion of Gender Equality 
 
The ways that UBI simultaneously supports those on low wages 
and those engaged in non-labour market activities, while 
facilitating a reduction in work effort for others, provides a clear 
basis for us to analyse basic income’s effects on gender relations 
and gender equality. A number of scholars (e.g. Robeyns, 2000 
and McLean, 2016) have argued that UBI should in principle 
contribute to greater gender equality in the following ways. 
The individualised nature of UBI is seen to promote greater 
gender equality by reducing the dependence of women on their 
partner’s earnings. Existing welfare arrangements, in which 
entitlements are calculated at the household level, can harmfully 
distort people’s partnering and family decisions in two important 
ways. They can discourage people from forming partnerships 
due to so-called ‘couples penalties’ in the calculation of benefit 
payments and, perhaps more importantly, due to aversion to 
losing an independent source of income and tenure – particularly 
in the context of potentially unstable relationships, and particu-
larly when there are children in the household (Griffiths, 2017a). 
Calculating and paying benefits at the household level can also 
trap people into situations of dependency, and may lead to 
financial abuse and inequitable income sharing in the presence 
of intra-household power imbalances (Hobson, 1990). Both of 
these distortions of family and partnering decisions imply nega-
tive consequences for gender equality: women are more likely to 
end up ‘trapped’ in single-earner households and more likely to 
be relatively disempowered within households. Furthermore, it 
is well-established that women tend to be disadvantaged in the 
labour market and do a disproportionate amount of part-time 
and low-paid work; for these reasons, the ‘in-work benefit’ aspect 
of basic income should strengthen their bargaining position rela-
tive to men. At the same time, the ‘-time subsidy’ element should 
“Existing welfare 
arrangements, in 
which entitlements 
are calculated at the 
household level, can 
harmfully distort 
people’s partnering 
and family decisions”
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enable men – who are more likely to work full-time – to reduce 
their hours of paid work and shoulder a greater proportion of 
unpaid care work. UBI could also help to address gendered 
inequalities in employment contribution histories and pension 
entitlements (Parker, 1993). In recognising the importance and 
value of unpaid care work (by providing those so engaged with 
an independent income) and compensating dual-earner families 
for their use of formal childcare services, it is argued that basic 
income should redistribute bargaining power towards women in 
a minimally presumptive manner – neither directing payments 
exclusively to care-givers (and thus contributing to their margin-
alisation from the labour market) nor penalising female workers.
Labour Market Change
While the preceding paragraphs have focused on the institutional 
features of and pressures on mature welfare states in seeking 
to explain growing interest in and support for basic income, 
an equally important justification – as reflected by popular 
narratives about basic income’s rise – relates to fundamental 
structural changes with respect to the labour market.  
 
Automation and the Spectre of Technological Unemployment  
 
Automation is a broad term encompassing the range of ways 
in which technological developments influence labour market 
structures – what work will be done by human labour as well as 
where and how it will be carried out, and by whom. The OECD 
(2016a) summarise these developments as “ever increasing com-
puting power, Big Data, the penetration of the Internet, Artificial 
Intelligence (AI), the Internet-of-Things, and online platforms”. 
The upshot is that such technologies are able to carry out an 
array of increasingly sophisticated tasks – including those that 
require “reasoning, sensing and deciding” ¬– that were previ-
ously the sole preserve of human labour, leading to fears about 
‘technological unemployment’. 
An influential study by Frey and Osborne (2013) has fuelled 
fears, estimating that about 47% of jobs are at risk in the US. 
However, these findings have been challenged by the OECD 
(2016b: 4), who criticise Frey and Osborne’s assumption that 
“whole occupations rather than single job-tasks are automated 
by technology”; they estimate the proportion of jobs likely to 
be lost to technological advances at around 9% on average. 
Of course, even if ‘only’ 9% of jobs disappeared and were not 
replaced by newly created opportunities for employment, this 
would present a huge problem. But is this really likely?
Unemployment rose sharply in the aftermath of the financial 
crisis that erupted in 2007, but has fallen from a peak around 
2010 for the OECD as a whole. There is a marked contrast 
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between the European and US figures: in 2015 US unemployment 
stood at around 5.29% while the EU average was 9.39% (OECD, 
2017b). However, it is worth noting that although the US has 
relatively low unemployment, full-time employment ratios have 
also fallen, as people (especially men) have exited the labour 
market entirely (ibid.). This is in contrast to the EU, OECD, UK, and 
Japanese economies, all of which have seen increases in aver-
age employment rates between 2000 and 2015 (EU and OECD 
figures are simple average). On the whole, the data suggest that 
a significant proportion of unemployment is cyclical and will fall 
further as economic conditions improve (e.g. due to increased 
consumer confidence and reductions in government deficits). 
On the other hand, recovery from the effects of the ‘Great 
Recession’ has occurred much more slowly than in comparison 
to previous recessions. One possible cause may be that long-
term structural factors – including but perhaps not limited to 
automation – have exacerbated the effects of a recession that 
was, initially at least, largely cyclical in nature (Brynjolfsson and 
McAfee, 2012). In any case, it seems difficult to conclude with 
any certainty that automation has exhibited any negative causal 
effect on employment levels. This is especially true in the UK, 
which has maintained very high levels of employment even 
through the recession (Gregg et al., 2014), albeit subject to low 
levels of productivity and wage growth. 
Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence, of course. 
But the data raise the question: why does technological unem-
ployment seem not to have transpired? As Hughes (2014) notes, 
the danger of technological unemployment was first raised by 
Keynes (1930). Keynes’ explanation for the danger referred to the 
“discovery of means of economising the use of labour outrun-
ning the pace at which we can find new uses for labour”; in this 
way, the spectre of technological unemployment is explicitly 
related to demand deficiency in goods and services markets 
which lead to excess labour supply. 
In the event, new labour-saving technologies did not lead 
inexorably towards increasingly severe levels of unemployment. 
As Vivarelli and Pianta (2000) document, there are five com-
pensatory employment effects that counteract technological 
unemployment: 
• New machines and products require workers to build 
and service them. 
• Price decreases triggered by more efficient production 
processes stimulate demand for other products. 
• New investments are instigated by the higher returns on 
capital that arise from more efficient production. 
• Higher wages in activities and sectors that complement 
technology can stimulate demand. 
• Lower wages in activities and sectors that substitute for 
technology can help labour markets to clear.  
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Of course, just because mass technological unemployment 
hasn’t arrived, does not mean it won’t. As Frey and Osborne 
(2013: 13) argue, increased computing power could ensure that 
‘destructive’ effects of technology on demand for labour exceed 
‘capitalisation’ effects. In any case, arguments in favour of basic 
income do not rest solely on the onset of mass unemployment. 
 
Wage Polarisation, ‘Lousy’ Jobs, and Increased Income 
Inequality 
 
In the early days of automation of manufacturing, the innovation 
of assembly lines (‘Fordism’) provided “a relative complement to 
unskilled labour, while substituting for relatively skilled artisans” 
(Frey and Osborne, 2013: 9). But gradually, technological de-
velopments have given rise to “a modern pattern of capital-skill 
complementarity” (ibid.): 
In short, while factory assembly lines, with their extreme 
division of labour, had required vast quantities of human 
operatives, electrification allowed many stages of the produc-
tion process to be automated, which in turn increased the 
demand for relatively skilled blue-collar production workers to 
operate the machinery. 
Due to steady productivity gains as well as the role of col-
lective bargaining, even relatively unskilled blue collar workers 
were well remunerated in this era, since in the Fordist production 
model “increments of productivity linked to ever greater use of 
automated machinery... happen only as a result of paid opera-
tional activities” (Lucarelli and Fumagalli, 2008: 76). However, 
according to Lucarelli and Fumagalli (ibid.), Fordism has given 
way to an economic model that they term ‘cognitive capitalism’, 
a model to which intangible knowledge (both tacit and codified) 
contributes an increasingly large share of productivity gains in 
comparison to both physical capital and labour. Furthermore, 
“due to the internationalization of production, the diffusion of 
information and communication technologies, and innovations 
in the transportation of commodities, manufacturing activities 
have been shifting to developing countries whereas financial, 
technological, supervising, logistical, and control activities have 
been concentrated in the highly industrialized countries” (ibid.: 
77). 
These trends seem to imply that – in high-income countries 
particularly – demand for high-skill and knowledge-intensive 
forms of labour should rise relative to those requiring low skill 
levels. While intuitively appealing, this is too simplistic. As Goos 
and Manning (2007) observe, the impact is not differentiated 
by the skill level of specific jobs per se, but on the prevalence 
of routine tasks in specific jobs. In a nutshell, there are a whole 
raft of mid-skilled and well-paid jobs that nevertheless involved 
performing routine tasks – book-keeping, manually operating 
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machinery, and so forth. These are the jobs that are under threat 
from automation, in terms of technological unemployment and 
downward pressure on pay. On the other hand, technological 
change has made relatively few inroads in replacing low-skilled 
non-routine ‘manual’ jobs such as cleaning, or high-skilled non-
routine ‘cognitive’ jobs that require human creativity or involve 
“professional and managerial” roles that are complementary to 
technology (ibid.: 118). 
Technological change thus appears to strengthen the position 
of workers involved in industries featuring non-routine tasks that 
cannot be easily automated relative to those in sectors charac-
terised by routine tasks. And herein lies the real problem with 
automation: that it contributes to greater polarisation between 
‘lovely’ and ‘lousy’ jobs, hollowing out ‘the middle’ and exacer-
bating income inequality, rather than increasing unemployment 
per se. 
A further way in which technological change may be seen to 
lead to increasing levels of inequality is suggested by Lucarelli 
and Fumagalli (2008). The growing contribution of proprietary 
technology to ‘value added’ is appropriated by a small number 
of large powerful firms; to the extent that the development of 
valuable proprietary technology is subject to economies of 
scale, large firms have advantages over small ones, for which 
sunk costs associated with high-tech research and development 
activities present significant barriers to entry. These large power-
ful firms are able to use their market power in combination with 
outsourcing and offshoring strategies to increase their control 
over subordinate labour processes, thus reducing the share of 
revenue paid to labour. These conditions increase the opportuni-
ties for large firms to accrue economic ‘rents’ and motivate 
increased flows of financial capital towards investment in high-
tech enterprises, returns to which also accumulate in such a way 
as to increase inequalities of wealth. 
 
Growing Precarity and the Gig Economy 
 
In addition to the trends identified above, some scholars argue 
that labour markets provide less security than prior to the globali-
sation era, beyond the proliferation of low-paid work (Standing, 
2011). Although there are myriad conflicting definitions, precari-
ous work has manifested itself in the proliferation of zero-hour, 
temporary and fixed-term contracts as well as involuntary 
part-time work or self-employment and low-paid work (McKay 
et al., 2012). As McKay et al. (ibid.: 5) note, while “full-time, 
permanent work remains the dominant form of employment 
relationship… there has been significant growth in a wide range 
of non-standard forms of employment relationship with the result 
that significant numbers of Europe’s workers are now excluded 
from welfare benefits and/or employment protections”. Thus, the 
concept of precarious work is not defined solely by contract type 
but also relates to income adequacy and social rights. 
“The concept of 
precarious work is 
not defined solely 
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However, it is easy to exaggerate the nature and significance 
of these emerging trends, and to overstate their pertinence to 
the UK specifically. The employment rate and the number of 
people in full-time employment are the highest they have been 
since comparable records began in 1971 (ONS, 2017). Since 2013, 
the proportion of people in part-time jobs because they could 
not find full-time employment has fallen from 18% to around 12% 
(ibid.). Perhaps surprisingly, average job tenure has increased 
steadily over the past 20 years (Gregg and Gardiner, 2015). 
Gregg and Gardiner (ibid.) distinguish three groups: the workless 
‘disadvantaged’; ‘insecure’ workers who are either in part-time 
or in temporary jobs, lack employment rights associated with 
lower periods of tenure, or are relatively poorly paid; and the 
‘privileged’, who tend to be in full-time, stable employment 
or well-established as self-employed. Based on these broad 
categories, they note that “there has been little change in the 
overall profile of insecurity… with 32 per cent of the working age 
population (excluding full-time students) classified as insecure in 
2014, compared to 30 per cent in 1994” (ibid.: 5). However, they 
also find that young people are increasingly heavily represented 
among the insecure, while increasing numbers of older workers 
occupy privileged labour market positions. Furthermore, “there 
is evidence that a sizeable but growing minority are facing 
particularly acute forms of precariousness. Insecurity appears to 
have deepened rather than broadened” (ibid.: 9). 
The Resolution Foundation reports that the use of zero-hour 
contracts in the UK has risen rapidly in the past decade, and 
probably far exceeds official figures. Zero-hour contracts are 
associated with low pay and underemployment (Pennycook et 
al., 2013: 3). While some workers might benefit from the greater 
flexibility that these forms of contract afford – and indeed it is 
possible that job creation is enhanced by employers’ capacity 
to offer non-standard contracts – for many of those relying on a 
stable income, the situation is less that satisfactory; zero-hour 
contracts appear to be a manifestation of acute power imbal-
ances between employers and workers (ibid.). Desperate people 
have no choice but to accept employment opportunities, exploit-
ative or inadequate though they may be. For example, according 
to the Social Market Foundation think-tank (2016) around one half 
of officially-registered self-employed people earn less than the 
national minimum wage. These forms of labour are less likely to 
be a positive lifestyle choice and more reflective of difficulties 
finding adequately paid employment opportunities. 
In summary, the evidence on labour market insecurity points 
to further polarisation of labour market outcomes. The so-called 
‘gig economy’ provides opportunities for people to work more 
flexibly, but also carries the danger of precarious and irregular 
incomes, as well as being incongruous with conventional in- and 
out-of-work benefits.  
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Basic Income: a Necessity Given Technological Change? 
 
Assuming that existing trends are going to continue and indeed 
become more pronounced, a number of recent analyses have 
presented basic income as an inevitable – or at least desirable 
– way to deal with these developments (Lucarelli and Fumagalli, 
2012; Hughes, 2014; Srnicek and Williams, 2015; and Walker, 
2016). Lucarelli and Fumagalli’s (2008: 77) argument is that as 
“the link between productivity gains and real wage dynamics 
began to collapse, giving sway to a dramatic polarization of 
income distribution… a renewed social contract based upon 
a new compromise between capital and labor” has become 
increasingly important. Crocker (2015: 101) takes a similar view, 
emphasising that UBI is required in order to maintain levels of 
consumer demand in the economy. As he puts it: 
In a thought experiment of a totally automated economy with 
a machine plugged into the earth to produce the total GDP, 
there would be no wages. This is an extreme of [the more 
plausible scenario of] declining real wages. There would be no 
demand in the economy, rather than the deficient demand we 
have now. It’s a Keynesian problem. 
For Srnicek and Williams (2015), basic income is one ele-
ment of reclaiming the emancipatory potential of technology 
without halting its (inevitable) march; the traditional tools of the 
left – state ownership, collective action, redistribution through 
generous social security programmes – are increasingly counter-
productive in the context of today’s rapidly changing global 
economy. 
There are several counterpoints to these varied but ultimately 
analogous theses. One is simply that concerns about technologi-
cal unemployment are exaggerated and sensationalist. This 
may be true but is less compelling in relation to arguments 
around wage polarisation and insecure work, which appear 
to be fairly stable long-term trends – although we cannot be 
entirely sure that technological change per se is to blame. 
According to Standing (2011), decades of neoliberal reforms have 
strengthened the hand of capital over labour; “as globalisation 
proceeded, and as governments and corporations chased each 
other in making their labour relations more flexible, the number 
of people in insecure forms of labour multiplied. This was not 
technologically determined”. In any case, it is clear that automa-
tion (and the threat thereof) is one among numerous factors that 
are exacerbating the dysfunctionality of the labour market with 
respect to ‘securing adequate job assets’; technological change 
per se is not required to make a case for basic income. 
Against this point, it must be acknowledged that technologi-
cal change does give rise to an especially robust argument for 
basic income. Trying to slow down or control technological 
change via public policy is surely ill-advised; there is a sense 
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of the inevitable march of progress. On the other hand, many 
adverse labour market changes have arisen as a result of power 
imbalances – between global capital, states and citizens – which 
have themselves been shaped by neoliberal public policies. In 
this view, there may remain tools other than basic income that 
can deal directly with hostile labour market trends rather than 
simply mitigating their worst effects. In this view, the decline of 
collective action and progressive taxation as tools for oppos-
ing the hegemony of capitalism can – and must – be opposed; 
but basic income is neither required for nor appropriate to the 
task. For some basic income critics, the post-work vision that a 
high-tech, basic income future promises is itself a “bad utopia 
for the left… It is a dangerous proposal that leaves us beholden 
to capital, the state, and money. In short, it consolidates capital-
ism” (Dinerstein et al., 2016). For others, of course, such as the 
technology entrepreneurs driving trends towards automation, 
this is precisely the point. But depending on one’s diagnosis of 
the problems at hand, basic income may appear an expensive 
and ineffective way of providing an adequate level of income 
security for all – and one which would fail to promote the sense 
of fulfilment and meaning that purposeful labour can bring to 
people’s lives.
The Significance of Increased Policy Attention
It seems unlikely that technological developments are going to 
lead to mass technological unemployment in the near future, 
although the prospect will remain a concern. A more likely 
scenario is that observable trends – towards greater polarisation 
of pay and conditions between lovely and lousy jobs, and the 
proliferation of increasingly insecure work for many – will con-
tinue. The question becomes, what are the political chances of 
actually implementing a radical reform such as basic income? 
A key feature to understanding the recent policy interest in 
basic income is that it is able to bridge the “protective” and “pro-
ductive” (activating) dimensions of the welfare state – to plug 
deficits in coverage that characterise residual and contributory 
systems while removing poverty and unemployment traps that 
characterise means-tested benefits, encouraging investment 
in human capital, and enabling people to balance their labour 
market activities and caring responsibilities more flexibly. These 
features of basic income are highly congruent with ongoing 
labour market trends and with policy feedback arising from gaps 
and tensions in existing welfare provisions. 
On the other hand, the policy appears to contradict exist-
ing trends towards retrenchment and in favour of increasingly 
stringent and punitive conditionality. The outcome of conflicting 
pressure for and against basic income as a policy solution – and 
thus, whether it occupies a genuine and significant place in the 
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next phase of European welfare policy reform – is highly uncer-
tain. As De Wispelaere (2016a) comments, “increased policy 
attention and political support counts as a valuable resource only 
to the extent that it can be calized upon by effective legislation. 
Facing up to the harsh political realities of welfare reform driven 
by principles of activation and austerity, how to proceed in 
moving the basic income proposal further up the policy agenda 
takes on a certain political urgency.” In this context, we explore 
the core issues of political feasibility – and two of the main 
determinants thereof – in the coming pages.
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Paying for UBI
A recurring criticism of UBI – which emanates from both left- and 
right-wing opponents – is that UBI is unaffordable. Van Parijs 
(2004) gives the lie to this statement. As he points out, the defini-
tion of UBI does not specify the level at which it is paid or how 
it interacts with the wider system of social security payments. It 
follows that “under some specifications – for example, ‘abolish 
all existing benefits and redistribute the corresponding revenues 
in the form of an equal low benefit for all’” – UBI is clearly af-
fordable, while under others such as “‘keep all existing benefits 
and supplement them with an equal benefit for all citizens at a 
level sufficient for a single person to live comfortably’ it is clearly 
not” (ibid.: 18). In other words, the question ‘is UBI affordable?’ 
is underspecified: it depends upon the specifics of the scheme, 
as well as what is meant by ‘affordable’. On the latter as on the 
former, there are a number of alternative perspectives. We deal 
with affordability first, before looking at the fiscal costs of a 
number of concrete schemes in relation to potential revenue 
sources.  
 
Alternative Perspectives on Affordability 
 
A sensible definition of ‘affordability’ simply requires that ex-
penditure on basic income must not exceed available sources 
of revenue in the long term; i.e. financing must be sustainable. 
Within this definition, we can distinguish a continuum of per-
spectives, ranging from conservative (in the sense that existing 
tax structures, and the overall levels of taxation considered as 
acceptable, are fixed) to more utopian (in the sense that radically 
reformed tax structures or alternative modes of financing may 
also be considered as viable options). Assuming that new taxes 
can be introduced, rates of existing taxes can be varied, and 
revenues can be reallocated from other purposes to pay for a 
basic income, the very concept of ‘affordability’ may be quite 
malleable. The debate largely hinges on different views about 
politically acceptable levels of taxation, and their associated 
effects on economic incentives.
The narrowest (most conservative) perspectives understand 
affordability in the context of existing expenditure and revenue 
levels. The rationale for this perspective on affordability is that 
spending increases have to be paid for via tax increases, which 
– when levied on personal or corporate income – distort incen-
tives to work, save and invest. As a result, to the extent that UBI is 
condoned at all, the need for tax increases should be eliminated 
(or at the very least severely curtailed) through a combination of 
low payment levels and compensatory elimination of benefits.
A more common position among UBI advocates is to insist 
upon what Torry (2016b) calls ‘revenue neutrality’. This means 
that increases in expenditure must be matched by increases in 
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revenue, so as not to exacerbate budget deficits – but does not 
impose restrictions on the level of resources that can be devoted 
to UBI1. Revenue neutrality does not preclude tax increases of 
any magnitude, although the sustainability of large tax increases 
may be limited as a result of behavioural distortions such as 
reductions in work effort, as well as tax avoidance and evasion. 
Furthermore, large tax increases may be seen as politically 
unfeasible regardless of their economic effects. 
In contrast, more radical proposals such as Crocker (2015) 
view deficit financing as feasible and indeed desirable, and as 
such see no need to balance spending increases with commen-
surate tax rises. Van Parijs and Van Der Veen (2006) envisage a 
UBI paid at a level such that personal incomes are (eventually) 
effectively taxed at 100% (implying no differential reward to work 
effort). For the purposes of this report, such proposals are largely 
of intellectual curiosity – as exercises in ‘realistic utopianism’ 
– and we accept the parameters of the existing tax system as 
broadly ‘given’. Thus, the following discussion proceeds on the 
understanding that the scope for tax increases is restricted by 
public perceptions and political feasibility, as well as by con-
siderations of economic sustainability. This does not mean that 
a UBI paid at a significant level should be discounted. Perhaps 
the most critical aspect of the affordability debate concerns 
something we have so far neglected to mention – the impacts of 
the UBI that are attained for given levels of expenditure. These 
impacts comprise both costs and benefits. A given policy is 
‘affordable’ – and indeed ‘good value’ – if it has net benefits for 
society as a whole, in comparison to alternatives. It is on this 
basis that Standing (2017: 154) suggests that far from UBI being 
unaffordable, given the huge social costs of poverty and inequal-
ity, “we cannot afford not to afford it”. To the extent that UBI 
may serve as part of an activation strategy and have an explicitly 
‘productive’ dimension, it may be considered a ‘social invest-
ment’ rather than a cost per se.  
 
How Much Would Different UBI Schemes Cost? 
 
Putting these arguments to one side for a moment, UBI – as dis-
cussed previously in Chapter 1 – comprises a family of schemes 
with variation around coverage, payment levels, and interaction 
with wider systems of social security. We also need to distinguish 
between gross cost of the UBI payments themselves, and net 
cost that accounts for the possibility of increased tax revenue 
and reduced expenditure on other benefits as a result of changes 
that occur in conjunction with the implementation of the UBI. 
Here, we present some selected models already examined in 
1. A more restrictive view of revenue neutrality is that only taxes substantively related to the UBI’s goals and objectives 
should be considered in definition of neutrality – what Torry (ibid.) calls ‘strict revenue neutrality’.
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Martinelli (2017a) and Reed and Lansley (2016) (of which some 
are also discussed in greater depth below) in terms of their gross 
costs, for now assuming no compensatory changes to tax or 
benefit systems. 
As shown in Table 1, the most modest scheme illustrated here 
has gross fiscal costs of £140bn. Under this scheme, payments 
equalling the value of the personal income tax allowance (PITA) 
for workers whose income exceeds the £11,000 threshold – 
£2,200 per annum or £42.19 per week – are made to everyone. 
The most ‘generous’ scheme, pitched at the level of existing 
wage replacement benefits for children and pensions plus the 
value of the PITA – £115.29 per week for working age adults, 
£197.79 for pensioners and £109.20 for children – costs £427bn. 
For ease of comparison, the entire benefits bill (for the 2016-17 
tax year) was £210bn; even the lowest payment level here repre-
sents two-thirds of that total. Obviously, increases in expenditure 
such as these appear highly unrealistic without significant 
changes to tax and benefit systems. The question then becomes: 
what tax and benefit changes would be required to render such 
UBI schemes fiscally feasible, and what would be their combined 
distributional consequences? We address these questions in 
the next sections, after considering first the various sources of 
revenue from which UBI can in principle be paid. 
Table 1: Gross Fiscal Cost of Selected Illustrative 
UBI Proposals
Scheme/
Source
Payment Level (Per Week) and Structure Gross Fiscal 
Cost
Model 1.1 
Martinelli, 
2017a
Low: 
£42.19 uniform payment for all children and adults
£140bn
Scheme 2 
Reed and 
Lansley, 2016
Low/moderate:
£71 for adults 25-64; £61 for adults 16-24; 
£51 for pensioners; and £59 for children
£209.5bn
Model 2.1
Martinelli, 
2017a
Moderate:
£73.10 for men (18-64) and women (18-62); 
£155.60 for pensioners; and £67.01 for children 0-17
£288bn
Model 3.1 
Martinelli, 
2017a
Moderate/high (as model 2.5 above, with disability 
supplements):
£35.75 for disabled adults; £76.65 for severely disabled 
adults (on top); £59.45 for disabled children; and
£24.07 for severely disabled children (on top)
£326bn
Model 4.1
Martinelli, 
2017a
High:
£115.29 for working-age adults (18-64 for men, 18-62 
for women); £197.79 for pensioners; and £109.20 for 
children 0-17
£427bn
Sources of Funding 
 
In the abstract, the magnitude of these figures may be hard to 
comprehend: we need to situate them in the context of existing 
tax revenue and the revenue effects of possible changes to the 
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tax system. 
In the 2015-16 tax year, HMRC (2016a) reported receipts of 
£533.6bn, of which:
• £282.2bn (52.9%) came from payroll taxes – £168.5bn 
(31.6%) from Income Tax and £113.7bn (21.3%) from 
National Insurance Contributions
• £44.4bn (8.3%) came from Corporation Tax
• £3.4bn (0.06%) came from the Bank Levy
• £7.1bn (1.3%) came from Capital Gains Tax
• £115.4bn (21.6%) came from VAT
• £27.6bn (5.2%) came from Fuel Duty 
In this section, we consider the potential of four main types of 
tax in terms of funding UBI: payroll taxes, business taxes, prop-
erty and wealth taxes, and natural wealth dividends and pollution 
taxes. Table 2, below, summarises the revenue effects of some 
illustrative changes to the tax system relating to each of these 
forms of taxation.  
 
Payroll Taxes 
 
As Van Parijs and Vanderborght (2017: 134) observe, personal 
income/payroll taxes (including social security contributions) 
are “by far the most obvious way of funding a basic income”. In 
the UK system, income tax and national insurance contributions 
comprise over half of total tax revenue; the remainder is mainly 
comprised of corporate income, property, and sales taxes. Due 
to the amounts of revenue required to fund a substantial UBI, 
“it is difficult to imagine” funding a UBI “without relying at least 
in part on this form of [payroll] taxation”. Indeed, as shown in 
Table 2, below, eliminating tax allowances (reductions on exemp-
tions on standard rates) on Income Tax and National Insurance 
Contributions (NICs) would raise well over £100bn in additional 
revenue. 
Another reason for the preponderance of payroll taxes in 
concrete UBI schemes is that the microsimulation models 
developed for the purpose of ‘costing’ UBI proposals utilise data 
on household incomes. For example, the Family Resource Survey 
(FRS) surveys 20,000 households on their financial position and 
a host of characteristics that jointly determine their tax liabilities 
and benefit entitlements. Liabilities for other taxes – such as 
consumption taxes, environmental or resource-use taxes, or 
wealth (e.g. land value) taxes – are not reported in the survey. 
Payroll taxes may be the most immediately realistic way to 
fund a UBI, but are they a good one? The danger, as spelled out 
by Van Parijs and Vanderbrought (2017) is that higher marginal 
tax rates will alter individuals’ incentives to work, thus threaten-
ing the financial sustainability of the scheme, as suggested 
above. It could also be added that forcing workers to pay for 
a UBI for those unwilling to work may be seen as inherently 
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exploitative (Howard, 2015), and undermines the notion that 
UBI is a just form of compensation for the private appropriation 
of commonly owned resources (see Appendix 1). These issues 
may help to explain the position of scholars such as Standing 
(2017) that UBI funding should be more focused on the reform of 
regressive subsidy schemes and corporation tax systems – on 
the redistribution of economic ‘rents’. Some well-known options 
of this type, including land value taxation and taxes on the use of 
public resources for private gain, are discussed below. However, 
while it is difficult to disagree with the progressive principle 
behind such a position, it is important to remain circumspect 
about the practical and political possibilities for dramatically 
increasing taxes on the wealthy and powerful. 
In any case, UBI affordability is usually considered in the 
context of changes to payroll tax rates and personal allowance 
thresholds, and these changes form the basis of the microsimula-
tion studies we report in the second section of Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 4. However, there are a number of other notable revenue 
sources, the potential for which we discuss next. We discount 
the prospect of consumption taxes being used to fund a basic 
income on the grounds that such taxes are usually regressive, 
which appears at odds with any rationale for introducing UBI in 
the first place.  
 
Business Taxes 
 
As shown above, Corporation Tax comprised 8.3% of total tax 
revenue in 2015-16, while locally administered business rates 
raised just 4.3% of total revenue in 2012-13 (IPPR, 2013). As a 
result, these taxes would need to be raised very substantially in 
order to generate a significant amount of revenue. However, as 
payroll taxes are criticised because they distort labour market 
incentives, business taxes may be criticised because they distort 
incentives for hip and investment. Furthermore, taxing corporate 
profits is difficult due to the mobility of multinational firms and 
the scope for tax avoidance. In any case, the amount of tax raised 
by increasing Corporation Tax would be fairly negligible; an 
estimated £0.8bn for the current tax year (HMRC, 2016b), imply-
ing it could play only a small part in funding a UBI in the UK. 
There are a number of more ‘radical’ tax reform proposals 
that relate more clearly to the idea of charging businesses 
that extract economic ‘rent’ through ownership and control of 
resources that should be owned in common. Taking a broad 
view of such resources, we might include “permission to create 
money, charge interest and provide financial service” as a 
common resource for which businesses need to pay a fee (Farley, 
2016). According to Farley (ibid.), reforming and increasing the 
rate of the Bank Levy – a tax that raised just £3.4bn in 2015-16 – 
could generate an additional £10bn per year, based on the level 
of implicit subsidies currently received by the banking sector.
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Table 2: Estimated Revenue Generated by Selected 
Illustrative Tax Changes
Tax Heading Tax Change Estimated 
Additional 
Revenue
Payroll Taxes Increase in base rate of income tax by one 
percentage point
£3.9bn
Increase in higher rate of income tax by one 
percentage point
£785mn
Elimination of personal income tax allowance £72bn
Elimination of National Insurance lower 
earnings threshold
£21.2bn
Elimination of National Insurance upper 
earning threshold
£25.1bn
Business Taxes Increase corporation tax by one percentage 
point
£805mn
Banking licenses* £10bn
Property and 
Wealth Taxes
Increase standard rate of inheritance tax by 
one percentage point
£50mn
Increase lower capital gains tax rate by one 
percentage point
Negligible
Increase higher capital gains tax rate by one 
percentage point
£15mn
Implement land value tax of three percent 
on residential land*
£158bn
Environmental 
and Natural 
Resource Taxes
Carbon tax of £20 per tonne of emissions* £10.2bn
Source: HMRC (2016b) except items marked * which are based on estimates from 
Farley (2016).
Property and Wealth Taxes 
Taxes based on the value of property are already in existence in 
the form of the locally-administrated Council Tax, which raised 
£26.3bn in 2012-13 (IPPR, 2013), and Stamp Duty, which raised 
£10.7bn in 2015-16 (HMRC, 2016a). Specific wealth taxes include 
Inheritance Tax and Capital Gains Tax, which generated £4.7bn 
and £7.1bn respectively in the same period (ibid.). As shown in 
Table 2, the revenue raised by increases in these taxes would 
be negligible in comparison to the costs of most UBI proposals, 
although they might contribute to a package of tax reforms that 
would generate sufficient revenue for some form of UBI. 
A specific type of wealth tax that has many positive attributes 
and has been mooted as a potential source of revenue for a UBI 
is the land value tax. Unlike labour or capital, the supply of land 
is fixed, so taxing it is economically efficient; it would not reduce 
the amount of land available. It would also be progressive, and 
difficult to avoid or evade (Sarma, 2016). Again, such taxation can 
be seen as justifiable from the perspective that land ownership 
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– abstracting for the moment from the thorny problem of ‘added 
value’ – represents the appropriation of commonly-owned 
resources for private gain. 
According to estimates by Farley (2016), taxing residential 
property at 3% per year would raise £157.2bn, taxing agricultural 
land at 2% would raise £6.9bn, and taxing commercial property 
at 6.5% would raise £51.2bn. Of course, there are substantial 
practical and political barriers to implementing such a tax, 
particularly at the aforementioned rates (IPPR, 2013).  
 
Natural Resource Dividends and Pollution Taxes  
 
Most concrete UBI proposals are costed on the understanding 
that UBI would be funded through tax revenues, but some – 
including the Alaskan Permanent Fund Dividend discussed 
previously – are funded through dividends on publically-owned 
assets, also known as ‘sovereign wealth funds’. Sovereign 
wealth funds may be based on investment in financial or non-
financial assets, but are frequently funded by ‘windfalls’ relating 
to revenue from the production of minerals such as oil or gas 
(Widerquist and Howard, 2012a; 2012b). The Alaskan Permanent 
Fund Dividend entitles every Alaskan resident an average of 
$1,150 per year – a fairly modest payment in a very sparsely 
populated and resource-rich state (McFarland, 2016). Payments 
also fluctuate widely; they were $2,072 in 2015, falling to $1,022 
last year. Nevertheless, funds of this type can clearly contribute 
to the establishment of a partial basic income. 
The general principle of pollution taxes is to discourage harm-
ful activities by ensuring that producers and consumers face the 
‘social costs’ of their actions. In this regard, an intriguing source 
of revenue for a basic income that has been mooted recently is 
a ‘carbon tax’ (Howard, 2012). In the US, a group of conservative 
economists have proposed that a basic income funded through 
carbon taxes would be efficient – sending out correct signals 
about the true costs of carbon emissions; fair, with broadly 
progressive incidence; and politically feasible, by overcoming 
antipathy towards taxes by distributing the proceeds in an 
automatic and transparent manner (Climate Leadership Council, 
2017). According to Farley (2016), a carbon tax levied at a rate of 
£20 per tonne of emissions could raise about £10bn in revenue in 
the UK – only enough to pay for a very modest scheme.
Microsimulation of Illustrative Revenue-Neutral 
Schemes: Comparison of ‘Full’ and ‘Partial’ 
Schemes in the UK
The upshot of the preceding discussion is that any serious UBI 
proposal must be accompanied by significant revenue-raising 
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measures; we assume that even if deficit financing were desir-
able, the level of borrowing required to fund even the most 
modest of schemes would certainly be politically unfeasible. 
Clearly, whether these come in terms of tax increases, benefit 
cuts or both, they will have profound distributional consequenc-
es that need to be addressed. 
The fiscal and distributional implications of UBI are intimately 
linked. Why should this be the case? Intuitively, we know that in 
order to contain net costs we must raise taxes and/or eliminate 
a large number of other benefits. The higher the level of UBI, the 
greater the compensatory changes will have to be. When other 
benefits are withdrawn as part of the UBI scheme, there is a clear 
trade-off between the goals of containing costs and ensuring 
that existing benefit recipients do not lose out – especially given 
that such people are likely to be disadvantaged in the first place. 
Increasing the level of the uniform payment helps to ensure that 
fewer households face significant falls in their income levels, 
but this obviously raises costs. This problem arises because a 
uniform payment cannot adequately cover the complex array 
of circumstances and needs for which social security systems 
are intended, unless it is pitched at a very high level. Prominent 
among such circumstances are those relating to disability, 
childcare and housing, each of which may give rise to specific 
costs which vary hugely across individuals and households. The 
problem can be stated succinctly as follows: an affordable UBI 
is inadequate, and an adequate UBI is unaffordable. 
Is this really the case? In the following, we examine this 
proposition in relation to a series of schemes that are broadly 
revenue neutral, in the sense described above: that any increase 
in spending will be (roughly) matched with commensurate 
increases in tax revenue. 
I summarise a number of the IPR’s own findings (Martinelli, 
2017a; 2017b) as well as those of Torry (2016a) and Reed and 
Lansley (2016). The aim is to compare two alternative and 
commonly-proposed approaches to designing a UBI: approaches 
that eliminate most other benefits, and those that leave them 
in payment, recalculating them to take account of the UBI. We 
call these ‘full’ and ‘partial’ UBI schemes respectively, although 
we note these terms are disputed. 
A summary of the key features and fiscal and distributional ef-
fects of the four schemes analysed here is provided in Appendix 
2.  
 
Revenue-Neutral Schemes in which the Majority of Existing 
Benefits are Eliminated (‘Full’ Schemes) 
 
IPR Working Papers (Martinelli, 2017a; 2017b) have modelled a 
number of schemes in which UBI payment replaces the majority 
“There is a clear 
trade-off between the 
goals of containing 
costs and ensuring 
that existing benefit 
recipients do not lose 
out”
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of means-tested benefits2. As we noted in Martinelli (2017a) part 
of the rationale for the introduction of UBI is the administrative 
simplicity and economic efficiency afforded by the elimination 
of means-testing, contributory mechanisms and employment-
related conditions from the benefits system. The withdrawal and 
replacement of means-tested benefits, in particular, strengthens 
the rationale for the implementation of a UBI in terms of admin-
istrative savings, the reduction of stigma, and the elimination of 
poverty and unemployment traps through high withdrawal rates. 
For this reason, it may be intrinsically as well as fiscally desirable 
for existing benefits to be removed in line with the implementa-
tion of UBI. 
The findings discussed in this section refer to two schemes 
modelled in Martinelli (2017a; 2017b) which are arguably the most 
plausible ‘mainstream’ proposals examined in those papers. 
These were named Models 2.5 and 3.5 in Martinelli (2017a) and 
Model B and C in Martinelli (2017b). For simplicity and to facilitate 
the discussion that follows, we refer to these schemes as Full 
Scheme 1 and Full Scheme 2, respectively. 
Both of the schemes cover the entire population, have pay-
ment levels consistent with existing levels of benefits – implying 
differentiated payments for children, working age adults and 
pensioners, as described below – and are implemented in 
conjunction with the elimination of the majority of benefits. In 
Full Scheme 2, an attempt is made to mitigate losses among 
households affected by disability by making an additional 
payment, designed to compensate for the loss of premiums 
associated with withdrawn working age benefits. Both schemes 
are compared with a ‘base’ scenario representing tax and benefit 
policies prevailing in the 2016-17 tax year, using 2016 FRS data. 
The details of the schemes are as follows:  
 
Full Scheme 1: payment equal to level of standard benefits 
 
Weekly payments, based on benefit levels in the 2016/17 tax year, 
are as follows:
• £67.01 for dependent children 0 – 17. This is based on 
the rates of Child Benefit (CB) paid for second and sub-
sequent children (£13.70 p.w.), plus the maximum child 
element of Child Tax Credit (CTC) (£2,780 p.a.).
• £73.10 for working-age adults (18 – 64 for males, 18 – 62 
for females). This is based on the basic payments for 
Employment and Support Allowance (ESA), Income 
Support (IS) and Jobseekers Allowance (JSA).
• £155.60 for pensioners (65+ for males, 63+ for females). 
This is based on the level of the Pension Credit (PC) 
2. Following standard practice, means-tested Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit were retained.
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standard minimum guarantee. 
The UBI is combined with the withdrawal of the Basic State 
Pension (BSP), Carers’ Allowance (CA), CB, CTC, ESA, IS, JSA, PC, 
and Working Tax Credits (WTC).  
 
Full Scheme 2: payment equal to level of standard benefits, with 
disability supplements 
 
Supplements are paid to any individuals determined to be 
‘disabled’, with additional supplements paid to those also deter-
mined to be ‘severely disabled’; see Martinelli (2017a) for details 
about how these statuses are ascertained. Payments are set at 
the same level as in Full Scheme 1, with supplements as follows 
(the intention has been to replace existing supplements and 
premiums as far as possible; see Martinelli (ibid.) for details about 
how the supplements are calculated):
• Disabled adults receive an additional £35.75 per week, 
being the amount of the ESA Support Group premium.
• Severely disabled adults receive an additional £76.65 
(on top of the disability premium), being the sum of the 
ESA/IS enhanced disability (£15.55) and severe disability 
(£61.10) premiums. 
• Disabled children receive an additional £59.45, the 
amount of the disabled child premium in CTC. 
• Severely disabled children receive an additional £24.07 
(on top of the disability premium), the amount of the 
severely disabled child premium in CTC. 
As for Full Scheme 1, the UBI is combined with the withdrawal 
of BSP, CA, CB, CTC, ESA, IS, JSA, PC and WTC, and taken into 
account in the calculation of other means-tested benefits.  
 
Tax Changes Required to Maintain Revenue Neutrality 
 
The gross fiscal cost of these schemes would be £288bn and 
£326bn for Full Scheme 1 and Full Scheme 2 respectively. 
However, the elimination of other benefits (as described above) 
reduces the welfare bill by £145bn and £147bn respectively. This 
leaves a shortfall of £143bn for Full Scheme 1 and £184bn for Full 
Scheme 2. 
In order to render the models (broadly) revenue neutral, we 
eliminate the PITA and abolish the lower and upper thresholds for 
National Insurance Contributions3. In addition, retaining the ex-
3. This means that employees pay a rate of 12% on all earned income. In the existing system, NICs are not paid below the 
primary threshold limit of £155 per week and are paid at a greatly reduced rate of 2% for those earning more than £827 per 
week.
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isting progressive tax band structure, we would need to increase 
the income tax rate across all tax bands by 4% in the case of Full 
Scheme 1, and 8% in the case of Full Scheme 2.  
 
Distributional Implications 
 
Considering the large increase in benefit expenditure and associ-
ated tax rise, it is perhaps surprising to see that Full Scheme 1 has 
quite unfavourable distributional consequences. These include 
an increase in working-age poverty of around 7% and – surpris-
ingly given the generous rates of payment for children – an 
increase in child poverty too (of around 1%). In addition, the Gini 
coefficient measure of inequality increases by around 4%. 
Moving to the more detailed findings reported in Martinelli 
(2017b), a large number of households would lose out from the 
proposed scheme: 42% of households would see their dispos-
able incomes decrease, with 6% losing more than 25% of their 
previous income. While the distributional consequences of Full 
Scheme 1 are progressive on aggregate – with the bottom four 
income quintiles gaining on average and only the upper quintile 
losing out – nevertheless “large numbers of poor and middle-
income households would be significantly worse off: 7% of the 
poorest households lose over 25% of their initial income and 
over a fifth of quintile 2 […] would lose over 10% of their income 
compared to the base scenario. Thus, while the richer quintiles 
lose more in absolute terms, those in the poorer quintiles who 
lose do so by a proportionally greater amount of their income” 
(ibid.: 30). 
The distributional implications of Full Scheme 2 are more 
favourable; this is unsurprising since the purpose of the introduc-
tion of the supplements was to compensate disabled individuals 
– albeit in a fairly ‘blunt’ manner – for the reduction in support 
they would receive as a result of a uniform payment replac-
ing one tailored to their specific needs. As a result, both child 
poverty and working-age poverty rates fall by a considerable 
amount: around 14-15%. In addition, there is a marked fall in the 
Gini coefficient of inequality, by 5.5%. 
However, the more detailed findings presented in Martinelli 
(2017b) provide some cause for concern. 44% of households 
would experience income losses under this scheme, with 10% 
losing more than 10% of their previous income. While there are 
fewer households experiencing very large losses (over 25% of 
previous income) than Full Scheme 1 – 1% compared to 6% – such 
losses are far from trivial. And while the distributional conse-
quences of the scheme is highly progressive on average, there 
are still unacceptably high proportions of households losing out 
among the lower income deciles: a significant minority (8%) of 
households in quintiles 1 to 3 would stand to lose over 10% of 
their base income.  
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UBI Schemes in which Existing Benefits are Retained and their 
Levels Recalculated (‘Partial’ Schemes) 
 
One way around the adverse distributional effects found in the 
schemes above is to take an alternative approach: rather than 
eliminating a large array of means-tested benefits, to leave them 
in payment, recalculating their level taking into account the new 
UBI payment. This is the approach taken by Torry (2016a) and 
Reed and Lansley (2016), both of which aim to identify immedi-
ately feasible schemes. 
In this section I summarise the findings of Torry’s (2016a) 
Scheme β and Reed and Lansley’s (2016) Scheme 2.  
 
Scheme β 
 
The model is compared with a base scenario representing tax 
and benefit policies prevailing in the 2015-16 tax year. Weekly 
payments are as follows:
• £60 for adults 25-64
• £50 for adults 16-24
• £30 for pensioners
• £20 for children (0-15)
All benefits are left in payment, with the UBI taken into ac-
count in the (re)calculation of means-tested benefits. 
 
Scheme 2 
 
The model is also based on the 2015-16 tax and benefit policies. 
Weekly payments are as follows:
• £71 for adults 25-64
• £61 for adults 16-24
• £51 for pensioners
• £59 for children (0-15)
In this model, Child Benefit is eliminated but all other benefits 
are left in payment, with the UBI taken into account in the (re)
calculation of means-tested benefits. 
 
Tax Changes Required to Maintain Revenue Neutrality 
 
Torry does not report the gross cost of Scheme β, but Scheme 2 
costs £209.5bn per annum. Reed and Lansley (2016) report that 
the recalculation of means-tested benefits saves around £41bn 
– far less than the saving implied by the elimination of all major 
benefits in the schemes described above. We can assume that 
figures for Torry’s Scheme β would be in the same ball park; both 
the costs and savings would be smaller, accounting for the lower 
payment levels. 
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Both schemes eliminate the PITA and harmonise NIC rates, in 
common with Model 2.5 and 3.5. In addition we would need to 
raise all income tax rates across all tax bands by 3% in the case of 
Scheme β and 5% in the case of Scheme 2. Scheme 2 still has a 
net cost of just over £8bn after these tax increases.  
 
Distributional Implications 
 
Scheme β has a number of favourable distributional conse-
quences. Torry (2016a) reports reductions in child poverty rates 
of around a third of their original level, and a fall in adult poverty 
of around a fifth. A key finding is that the scheme would impose 
“almost no disposable income losses on low income households 
at the point of implementation”, in direct contrast to Models 2.5 
and 3.5 as described above. Inequality measured by the Gini 
coefficient falls by 8.6%, and the numbers of claimants receiving 
various means-tested benefits, as well as the average value of 
claims, would fall. 
Scheme 2 has similarly favourable effects. The reduction in 
child poverty is larger than that predicted under Scheme β, at 
around 44%, but adult poverty levels fall by a smaller amount, ap-
proximately 14%. Reed and Lansley do not report the proportion 
of households gaining and losing overall, but among the poorer 
income deciles around three quarters of households gain from 
the reform, with only very small number experiencing losses. 
As for Torry’s scheme, there is a substantial fall in the number of 
claims to means-tested benefits, and a modest reduction in the 
Gini coefficient.  
 
A Three-Way trade-off in Policy Design 
 
It is clear that the partial schemes (in which all other benefits 
are retained and recalculated) fare much better than the full 
schemes (in which a large number of benefits are eliminated) 
in striking a balance between controlling fiscal cost on the one 
hand, and ensuring positive (or minimising adverse) distribu-
tional consequences on the other. It is probably correct to say 
that as a result, the former approach is the most feasible policy 
design option. The models of Torry (2016a) and Reed and Lansley 
(2016) appear to demonstrate that it is possible to design a UBI 
such that it is both affordable and adequate. 
Nevertheless, there are several reasons why this conclusion 
should be interpreted with caution. The first is simply that main-
taining means-testing implies that some of UBI’s most important 
goals must be sacrificed: specifically, reductions in administra-
tion costs and the bureaucratic intrusion that go hand in hand 
with means-tested benefits, and improvement in work incentives 
via removal of poverty, unemployment and bureaucracy traps. 
As we concluded previously (Martinelli, 2017a), the design of 
UBI schemes is indeed subject to a three-way trade-off between 
the goals of controlling cost, meeting need, and improving 
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administrative simplicity and work incentives (through the 
elimination of means-testing). Not only does this represent an im-
portant challenge to basic income’s normative appeal, but it also 
presents a predicament for attempts to build strategic alliances 
between different advocates with different priorities and goals. 
We return to these issues in Chapter 5. 
The second reason for caution is that demonstrating that UBI 
could have positive distributional consequences does not mean 
that it would be the best or most effective way to reduce poverty, 
or that the required tax rises would be politically acceptable. UBI 
is often seen as diverting scarce financial and political capital 
away from more pressing issues. No amount of favourable mi-
crosimulation modelling could detract from the ethical objection 
that, in Offe’s (2008) words, “there are so many things waiting 
to be done in the world”. The analysis confirms that UBI is an 
expensive policy option, in comparison to other more targeted 
schemes; this is hardly surprising, but important nonetheless. 
It could easily be countered that the partial schemes described 
here are unaffordable given their fairly limited effects and/or 
(equivalently) that they are inadequate given their huge fiscal 
implications; “a powerful new tax engine will pull along a tiny 
cart (a partial and inadequate basic income)” (Gough, 2016). This 
becomes particularly important if a specific scheme also fails to 
deliver the goals of administrative simplification and improved 
work incentives, as suggested above.
Finally, we note that the microsimulation analyses sum-
marised above are static models; they fail to take into account 
the possibility of behavioural (labour market) change. This is an 
inevitable shortcoming of the approach, but a potentially impor-
tant one considering that such a radical reform as basic income 
is likely to result in changes in labour market participation, as 
we examine in Chapter 4. In light of large rises in tax rates in all 
models, and the retention of means-tested benefits in the partial 
schemes, we might expect labour market responses to erode 
the tax base, calling into question the validity of our findings that 
such schemes really are affordable.
“Demonstrating 
that UBI could have 
positive distributional 
consequences does 
not mean that it 
would be the best 
or most effective 
way to reduce 
poverty, or that the 
required tax rises 
would be politically 
acceptable”
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UBI’s Labour 
Market Effects
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UBI’s Impact on Labour Market Participation
As discussed in Chapter 3, one element of basic income’s 
‘affordability’ – in terms of the sustainability of revenue streams – 
connects to the impacts that higher payroll taxes would have on 
labour market participation. However, given the contested nature 
and significance of this particular issue, UBI’s labour market 
effects warrant separate discussion. 
Basic income has highly ambiguous labour market effects, in 
terms of overall levels of participation, wage levels and working 
conditions. This helps to explain why, for some advocates, UBI 
has the potential to increase labour market participation while, 
for critics, it is more likely to lead to labour market withdrawal. 
Adding to the complexity is that labour market effects are likely 
to vary across individuals – depending upon a host of character-
istics such as their position in the labour market (e.g. their actual 
or expected wage), benefit recipiency status and preferences 
– and depend upon the wider labour market institutions (for 
example in terms of employment protection and minimum wage 
legislation) as well as the specifics of the UBI scheme in question 
(especially the level of payment). 
 
Income and Substitution Effects, and Measuring Financial 
Work Incentives 
 
A key to understanding individuals’ responses to financial work 
incentives lies in the twin concepts of income and substitution 
effects (see Gamel et al. (2006) and Gilroy et al. (2012) for further 
discussion of these concepts). We assume for simplicity that 
individuals face a trade-off between income (which equates to 
consumption) on the one hand and leisure on the other. The 
individual’s preferences for income and leisure, and the amount 
of leisure they would be required to sacrifice in order to attain 
an additional unit of income – their effective wage rate – jointly 
determine the amount they decide to work. 
The substitution effect relates to how much leisure the 
individual must sacrifice for more income; in other words, their 
effective wage rate. This depends on taxes on employment 
income as well as, crucially, the extent to which benefits paid 
to inactive and/or low-earning individuals are withdrawn as the 
individual enters employment or earns more money.
In order to describe UBI’s likely labour market effects we need 
to introduce three important measures of financial work incen-
tives: the participation tax rate (PTR), marginal effective tax rate 
(METR), and replacement rate (RR). 
• The PTR measures the proportion of gross earnings lost 
through tax and/or benefit withdrawal.
• The METR measures the proportion of each additional unit 
of earned income lost to tax and/or benefit withdrawal. 
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• The RR measures the ratio of ‘out-of-work’ income to 
‘in-work’ income (i.e. how generous out-of-work benefits 
are in comparison to net earnings). 
Higher values of these indicators imply weaker financial 
incentives to work as determined by the substitution effect, with 
very high values leading to unemployment and poverty traps. 
These describe situations in which people face little incentive to 
enter employment, or to progress in work or increase their work 
effort, respectively. 
The income effect relates to how much leisure and income 
the individual chooses to enjoy as a result of being able to 
afford more or less of both. In other words, the income effect 
represents the effect of a change in the effective wage rate, 
abstracting from the change in relative prices between income 
and leisure; it is a function of the individual’s preference for each. 
The substitution and income effects of tax and benefit 
changes can work in opposite directions. Consider an increase 
in the indicators above (PTRs, METRs and RRs) arising from a 
hike in the rate of income tax. Thinking about the substitution 
effect, working would become relatively less attractive compared 
to not, since the effective wage rate would have fallen; the 
individual might choose to reduce their work effort accordingly. 
On the other hand, the individual would have to work even more 
to consume as much as before – and, given their preferences, 
the income effect might lead them to choose to swap leisure for 
additional consumption (i.e. increase their work effort). A priori, 
we cannot know the direction of the income effect or the relative 
magnitude of either effect, although we know that the substitu-
tion effect will negatively affect work effort. 
 
Substitution Effects 
 
For anyone in receipt of means-tested benefits, a UBI paid in- and 
out-of-work would imply reductions in PTRs, METRs and RRs 
compared to existing provisions. The substitution effect of these 
reductions would tend to increase labour market participation, 
although the income effect could conceivably work in favour of 
increased leisure and reduced work effort if the UBI were more 
generous than benefits previously in payment. 
Against these effects are those arising from generalised 
increases in tax rates that usually accompany most UBI proposals 
(see Chapter 3) that imply higher PTRs, METRs and RRs, ceteris 
paribus. Evidence on the effect of tax rates on labour supply 
is summarised by Meghir and Phillips (2010). In general, the 
evidence conforms to our intuition that higher tax rates tend to 
reduce work effort; there is general consensus that although the 
substitution effect tends to exceed the income effect for changes 
in marginal rates, the effect varies significantly across different 
groups. It is also worth noting that workers do not have complete 
flexibility to vary their hours of work, even if it were optimum for 
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them to do so. In any case, the precise effect depends on the 
relative magnitudes of income and substitution effects, which 
vary at the individual level.  
 
Income Effects 
 
Gilroy et al. (2013: 44) posit that there are a number of groups for 
which the income effect would tend to be strong – given existing 
preferences for leisure and work – and for which we might expect 
“a sharp decline of labour supply”. These groups comprise 
those with weak labour market attachment and/or low earning 
potential, such as “the long-term unemployed, women looking 
after children, elderly employees, and possibly young entrants 
to the labour market” (ibid.). This tendency would be stronger for 
groups that would have been ineligible for means-tested benefits 
but who would (obviously) qualify for a UBI, because the substi-
tution effects described above would not be working against it. 
Relatedly, these effects would be stronger for individuals whose 
partners earn relatively high wages, since this would disqualify 
them from benefits means-tested at the household level.  
 
Family Structure and Sex 
 
One of the most important factors that determine individual 
labour market decisions is how going into work (or working 
more) would affect household income, since couples are likely to 
‘pool’ their income. This means that the financial incentives faced 
by primary and secondary earners within households depend 
on the earnings of the other, and how they affect their eligibility 
for benefit as a household. As a result, a non-worker partnered 
with a high-income main breadwinner would face substantially 
different work incentives compared to one living alone or with 
a low-earner (Adam et al., 2006). These dynamics explain why 
analyses of the effects of tax rates on labour participation have 
found clearly gendered effects, as Meghir and Phillips (2010: 204) 
summarise: 
Hours of work do not respond particularly strongly to the 
financial incentives created by tax changes for men, but 
they are a little more responsive for married women and lone 
mothers. On the other hand, the decision whether or not to 
take paid work at all is quite sensitive to taxation and benefits 
for women and mothers in particular. 
Given the above, theory suggests that within couples, basic 
income would lead to a reduction in work effort by women 
compared to men, given their relatively weak attachment to the 
labour market and lower wages. Indeed, this conforms to the 
findings of Sommer (2016), who modelled a negative income 
tax form of basic income. Applying theoretically-derived labour 
supply elasticities to German survey data, Sommer shows that 
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households ‘optimise’ their combined level of labour supply 
through a reduction in female labour supply among married 
women. On the other hand, he finds that single men and women 
both increase their labour supply. This confirms the finding of 
Kimball and Shapiro (2008) that “family labor supply decisions 
rather than sex per se accounts for most differences in labor 
supply decisions between men and women”.  
 
The Role of (Un)conditionality 
 
Another important factor in determining the likely effect of a 
basic income on labour market participation – neglected thus 
far – is the lack of behavioural conditions attached to UBI. 
According to economic theory, such conditions, when combined 
with punitive sanctions, should increase the costs of ‘idleness’ 
and increase job search engagement – increasing the claimant’s 
motivation and capacity to find work. McVicar’s (2010) reports 
evidence that intensified job search monitoring has reduced un-
employment. Gregg (2008) concludes that conditions attached 
to out-of-work benefits “have been highly effective”. 
Is the relationship between conditionality and labour market 
participation really so clear-cut? For several reasons, the real-
ity is murkier. Firstly, the evidence base is fairly sparse; as JRF 
(2014) notes, “it is hard to separate out the distinct impacts of 
higher levels of support, intensifying conditions, and/or greater 
exposure to sanctions”. There are theoretical complications too. 
Depending on the design and implementation of the conditions 
and sanctions, it is possible that claimants would be better off 
engaging in job search activities of their own design rather than 
applying for a set number of positions to fulfil bureaucratic 
quotas and attending compulsory appointments and courses. 
Indeed it is possible that such policies may even discourage 
more meaningful training and skills development activities 
(Immervoll and Pearson, 2009). Relatedly, the impact of the 
threat of labour market conditions on ‘job match quality’ – and 
therefore the longevity of any resulting employment ¬– may 
be negative, if sanctions preclude the refusal of even unsuit-
able jobs. Indeed, this is the basis of the efficiency argument 
in favour of generous unemployment insurance entitlements 
more generally (Marimon and Zilibotti, 1999; Caliendo et al., 
2013). According to recent insights from behavioural economics, 
pecuniary incentives can ‘crowd out’ intrinsic motivation to work 
(Pech, 2010), and the distrust inherent in the sanctions regime 
may encourage claimants to exert minimal effort (Verlaat and 
De Bruijn, 2016). As Pasma (2010) notes, intrinsic motivations for 
work are likely to be quite profound:
The assumption that people are motivated only by fear of 
poverty dismisses the wide range of human experience and 
motivation. People choose to participate in paid work for 
many reasons, including self-fulfilment, sense of vocation, 
“Theory suggests 
that within couples, 
basic income would 
lead to a reduction in 
work effort by women 
compared to men”
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ambition, the opportunity to participate in a larger project or 
activity they find meaningful, to achieve goals, to use skills 
and talents in particular areas, and to benefit from the unique 
social interactions that exist in a workplace. For many people, 
work is an important expression of identity. 
Such arguments suggest that be the personalised support 
elements of conditionality – which is entirely consistent with UBI 
– are more likely to encourage labour force participation than the 
punitive elements. Forthcoming experimental evidence on these 
issues will be highly valuable.  
 
Empirical Evidence 
 
How do our theoretical expectations conform to empirical 
observations? Notwithstanding the limitations to experimental 
evidence discussed in Chapter 1, we can draw out several les-
sons from the North American negative income tax experiments 
of the 1970s. 
In summary, the data suggest that the provision of an uncon-
ditional income floor was a marginal disincentive to work. On 
average across the US studies, men reduced their working hours 
by 6%, married women by 19%, and single women by 15% (Hum 
and Simpson, 1993). The reduction in labour market effort was 
even smaller for the Canadian study: 1%, 3% and 5% respectively 
for the same categories (ibid.). As Widerquist (2005) points out, 
it is by no means clear that even the larger reductions in labour 
supply would damage the case for basic income. Firstly, the 
labour market exodus predicted by UBI’s fiercest critics clearly 
did not materialise; and secondly, if the UBI permitted people to 
balance their work and home lives more effectively – especially 
women overburdened by a combination of domestic and paid 
work – the reduction in work effort could conceivably have con-
tributed to increased societal welfare. This relates to arguments 
that basic income scholars have made in favour of the provision 
of an ‘exit option’ to strengthen the bargaining position of work-
ers and to enable them to engage in unpaid but socially-valuable 
activities – arguments we consider next.
Exit Options, Bargaining Power and Labour Market 
Institutions
It is a curious characteristic of UBI that proponents stress – at 
various times and in different contexts – two apparently contra-
dictory goals. On the one hand, a large part of UBI’s rationale is to 
increase labour market participation through the elimination of 
poverty and unemployment traps. On the other, many advocates 
point to the capacity of UBI to provide an ‘exit option’, allowing 
people to reduce their labour market effort or quit the labour 
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market entirely. The issue is complicated by the multiplicity of 
versions of UBI that exist; it seems intuitive that a more generous 
UBI would be more likely to reduce labour market participation 
and improve the bargaining power of the recipient than a modest 
one, since it would enable one to live relatively comfortably 
without earned income. As Gray (2017) notes, “the higher the 
basic income in relation to the individual’s hourly wage, the 
greater would be the likely reduction in labour supply from 
people already in paid work”. It is also complicated by individual 
circumstances: as we have already demonstrated, UBI is likely 
to increase financial work incentives for some individuals while 
encouraging others to reduce their work effort. This is the basis 
of ‘the reshuffle effect’ introduced in Chapter 2. 
But even within a single UBI scheme and for an individual 
trapped in inactivity or unemployment there is really no con-
tradiction between the goals of encouraging work and 
simultaneously providing income security irrespective of 
work. It is entirely consistent for basic income scholars to argue 
that the concept would increase labour market participation at 
the same time as conferring workers with ‘the power to say no’.  
 
How Does Basic Income Affect Wages and Conditions? 
 
Like the majority of basic income advocates, Standing (2013) 
challenges the moral primacy of labour; exploitative ‘dead end’ 
jobs are of scarce value to society while many unpaid activities 
are profoundly important. It is a good thing, in this view, to 
provide people the chance to escape these forms of labour to 
engage in more important, valuable and fulfilling activities. 
Nevertheless, as Birnbaum and De Wispelaere (2016) rightly 
argue, the idea that basic income provides a realistic exit option 
is problematic. Unless pitched at a generous subsistence level, 
work would probably still be a necessity for the majority of 
people, and certainly for the most disadvantaged; the chances 
for ‘radical exit’ (leaving the labour market altogether) would be 
minimal (ibid.). Nevertheless, would not basic income strengthen 
the hand of all workers by permitting some to reduce their 
hours – or to exit the labour market temporarily to find alternative 
work¬– thus forcing improvements in the pay and conditions of 
the least advantaged too?
A number of scholars have refuted this. The problem arises 
because labour markets are stratified, with some workers able 
to exercise market power due to a relative shortage of essential 
skills and others facing intense competition for jobs – especially 
so in sectors in which production can be ‘offshored’, for example. 
Of course, low pay, precarious conditions and significant power 
imbalances characterise the latter segments of the labour 
market. Thus, “whereas the exit option is primarily geared at 
offering a secure basic floor to the most vulnerable, it may be 
precisely this target population that is disproportionately disad-
vantaged in terms of having the real opportunity to exercise their 
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exit option” (ibid.: 4). Furthermore, because of the way that a 
basic income would strengthen the hand of heterogeneously-ad-
vantaged workers unequally, it might drive “a wedge in between 
different workers’ factions, thereby harming collective solidarity 
in ways that are particularly damaging to vulnerable workers” 
(ibid.: 8). The lack of an exit option for such workers, and their 
weak bargaining position with respect to employers, means that 
basic income could end up exacerbating poor pay and condi-
tions if other workers were willing to reduce their wage demands 
as a result of the unconditional payment. Thus as Parker (1991) 
notes there is the danger that basic income “would aggravate the 
problem of low pay and subsidise inefficient employers” (Parker, 
1991: 13) leading to a proliferation of ‘lousy’ jobs. As Kenworthy 
(2015: 17) notes in relation to explicit wage subsidies, “employers 
might offer a lower wage than they otherwise would, and workers 
may be willing to accept a lower wage. Also, the subsidy may 
increase the supply of less-educated people seeking jobs, and 
without an increase in employer demand for such workers, this 
rise in supply is likely to push wages down”. 
However, as we argued previously (Martinelli, 2017b), basic 
income is not a wage subsidy per se and differs in the respect 
that with a UBI, individuals unwilling to work at the prevail-
ing wage rate are not forced to do so under threat of losing 
their benefit as well – as is the case with a wage subsidy1. For 
these reasons, the effects of a UBI on pay and conditions are 
ambiguous. 
In any case, it seems apparent that the direction and magni-
tude of these effects also vary in line with different levels of UBI 
payment, as Gray (2017) observes: 
A basic income that was high enough to enable people to 
refuse low pay or very insecure work would probably reduce 
the total of hours worked and the number of jobs offered… But 
if the basic income was not high enough to enable people to 
refuse ‘bad’ jobs, it would have the opposite effect – low pay 
would be more acceptable and employers would recruit more 
1. As we argued then (p. 18): 
the logic of this [wage subsidy] argument as it pertains to basic income is largely based on evidence on the wage 
suppressive effects of in-work benefits – necessarily, given the lack of empirical evidence on basic income per se – 
and in our view, the conclusions have somewhat limited validity when applied to the latter. In-work benefits are by 
necessity conditional not only on a work test but also on a means test. Thus, the combination of means-testing and work 
conditionality that characterises in-work benefits results in two implications:
• Workers are not able to reduce their labour and continue receiving benefit payments. 
• Workers are (relatively) indifferent between higher or lower pay; the state tops up their income to an acceptable level 
anyway in the case of the latter. 
Thus, theoretically speaking, means-tested in-work benefits can only suppress the reservation wage. By contrast, precisely 
because the payment of basic income is not conditional on employment or income, the effect on the reservation wage 
is ambiguous: it lowers the amount of employment income required to achieve an acceptable total income (exerting 
downward pressure of wages) but, at the same time, it permits individuals unwilling to work at the prevailing wage rate to 
enjoy a higher level of consumption regardless.
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easily at low wages than if there was no basic income.
Thus, our expectations are consistent with our understanding 
of how UBI affects labour market participation, with the erosion 
of pay and conditions possible (but not inevitable) in instances in 
which labour supply is expected to increase, and vice versa. As 
Van Parijs (2004: 17) puts it, basic income does indeed create “a 
potential for offering and accepting low-paid jobs that currently 
do not exist”, but it simultaneously “makes it possible to spread 
bargaining power so as to enable (as much as is sustainable) the 
less advantaged to discriminate between attractive or promising 
and lousy jobs”. 
 
Is a Minimum Wage and Employment Protection Still 
Necessary? 
 
The preceding arguments have clear implications for debates 
about the utility of wider labour market policies, such as mini-
mum wage law and other forms of employment protection. 
One line of argument proceeds that if workers have a secure 
income floor, such policies are redundant. As Groot (2002: 153-4) 
argues, “there is no need for minimum wage legislation, since 
workers are protected already by means of free access to a 
basic income… There is no need to have legislation on the rights 
of flex-workers, the number of vacation days, working hours, 
compulsory retirement, etc. All these issues can be left to the 
market”. Indeed, such measures may be not only redundant but 
actively counter-productive, contributing to involuntary unem-
ployment by preventing employers from offering terms which 
individuals would be happy to accept. 
But such arguments presume that a UBI would eliminate 
exploitation wholesale, a conclusion that does not appear justi-
fied by the evidence. On the contrary, if the arguments reviewed 
previously – that a low level of basic income would have a 
wage-dampening effect and increase competition for low-paid 
jobs – are correct, then these types of labour market policies 
would be essential to prevent employers from rolling back pay 
and conditions. 
At the heart of the controversy is what type of basic income 
is most desirable, and which of its many goals should be priori-
tised. A modest basic income combined with substantial labour 
market deregulation would appeal most strongly to libertarians 
and others for whom the main case in UBI’s favour relates to 
economic efficiency, labour market flexibility, and activation. A 
generous basic income alongside robust minimum wage legisla-
tion and employment protections is like to appeal to progressive 
UBI supporters for whom a robust exit option should be further 
bolstered by other forms of state intervention against workplace 
exploitation.
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Analysis of Specific Proposals
In this section, we examine two sources of evidence: analysis 
conducted in the context of preparation for the ongoing Finnish 
experiments (Kela, 2016 and Kangas et al., 2017), and the IPR’s 
own analysis of two schemes in the UK context (Martinelli, 
2017b).  
 
Microsimulation of Finnish ‘Partial’ Schemes 
 
Kangas et al. (2017) undertake microsimulation of the financial 
work-incentive effects for two basic income schemes paid at two 
different levels (€550 and €750 per month). The schemes are 
both ‘partial’ basic income at levels in which “the aim is not to 
replace other current transfers to the same extent as in full basic 
income” (Kela, 2016); all other benefits remain in payment, with 
the levels of means-tested social assistance benefits and housing 
allowances adjusted to take the basic income into account. In 
this sense, the schemes broadly resemble those discussed in 
Chapter 3 of this report (Torry, 2016a; Reed and Lansley, 2016), 
although of course we cannot generalise from the Finnish to 
the UK context in any meaningful way due to differences in their 
respective social security and tax systems. 
As Kangas et al. (2017) recognise, an important factor motivat-
ing interest in basic income in Finland is the potential the policy 
has to “combat various work incentives built into the present 
system” (p. 90). For simplicity, the authors replaced the existing 
progressive income tax structure with the flat tax required to 
attain revenue neutrality – 43% and 50.5% for the €550 and €750 
payments respectively – and proceed to examine how the imple-
mentation of a basic income affects work incentives. The authors 
report participation tax rates for three hypothetical individuals: 
an unemployed person in receipt of mean-tested unemployment 
assistance, another in receipt of unemployment insurance, and 
a lone parent with children in (means-tested) day care. All of the 
individuals are in receipt of housing allowance. 
As shown in Table 3, the general picture is mixed – and quite 
complex, reflecting the complexity of the existing system of 
social security in Finland. Under the €550 basic income, the 
social assistance recipient faces improved work incentives when 
moving into work at all earning levels, and when moving from 
part-time to full-time work. On the other hand, the social insur-
ance recipient faces deteriorated work incentives moving into 
part-time work paying €500 per month. The situation is similar 
under the basic income of €750 per month, except at that level 
– implying higher income tax rates – the circumstances in which 
individuals face weaker work incentives are more common. The 
lone parent faces higher participation tax rates when moving into 
all levels of work at both payment levels, with the exception of a 
very marginal reduction in participation tax rates when moving 
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from €1,000 to €2,000 per month in earning, under the €550 
scheme. 
 
Table 3: Summary of the Financial Incentive 
(Participation Tax Rate) Effects of the Finnish 
Partial Basic Income Schemes on Three Illustrative 
Claimant Types
Individual 
Circumstance
Change in 
Wage (€ per 
month)
Existing 
System
€550 Basic 
Income
€750 Basic 
Income
Unemployed, 
No Social 
Insurance 
Benefits
0 – 500 80.0 50.2 63.9
0 – 1000 65.1 63.6 74.0
0 – 2000 65.2 60.8 66.2
1000 – 2000 65.3 58.0 58.3
Unemployed, 
Social 
Insurance in 
Payment
0 – 500 36.9 50.2 63.9
0 – 1000 51.7 63.6 74.0
0 – 2000 66.3 60.8 66.2
1000 – 2000 80.9 58.0 58.3
Lone Parent 0 – 500 29.3 54.4 60.4
0 – 1000 42.0 64.7 72.8
0 – 2000 70.3 81.2 87.8
1000 – 2000 98.7 97.6 102.9
Source: Kangas et al. (2017)
In summary, Kangas et al. (2017: 91) conclude a partial basic 
income such as modelled here “would not necessarily increase 
the monetary incentives for part-time work. The level of basic 
income, the level and form of taxation, and the manner in which 
current social beneﬁts are reformed all have a substantial impact 
on the resulting participation tax rates”. Furthermore, this is a 
conclusion arising from examination of groups which face poor 
incentives in the existing system – those entangled in the benefit 
system. If we take into account work incentive effects for the 
working population as well – and thus the effects of generalised 
increases in tax rates – the results would likely be even less 
favourable for UBI’s credentials as an ‘activation’ measure. 
 
Microsimulation of UK ‘Full’ Schemes  
 
In Martinelli (2017b), we go further than Kangas et al. (2017) in our 
microsimulation of work-incentive effects; whereas they restrict 
their reported findings to illustrative groups, as described above, 
we examine changes in METRs and PTRs across a representa-
tive sample, which enables us to see how work incentives vary 
across the population on average and for specific sub-groups. 
We also analyse the proportions of individuals facing improved 
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or deteriorating work incentives. In this brief, we restrict discus-
sion to PTRs, for methodological reasons covered in the original 
report2. 
As in Chapter 3, our analysis is based on two schemes – Full 
Scheme 1 and Full Scheme 2 – argued to be the most plausible of 
those examined in our working papers, in which a UBI replaces 
the majority of benefits for children, wage replacement benefits, 
and old-age pensions; Full Scheme 2 includes supplements 
designed to compensate individuals for the loss of disability 
premiums previously in payment. Refer to Chapter 3 for details of 
the schemes. 
Our main findings are provided in table form in Appendix 3, 
and discussed below.  
 
Overall Effects on PTRs 
 
Full Scheme 1 leads to a reduction in PTRs – improved work 
incentives – of about 1% across the population on average. Full 
Scheme 2 has the opposite effect, increasing PTRs by about 6% 
on average. These averages mask a great deal of complexity, 
with high proportions of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ in both schemes; 
even under Full Scheme 1, over half of all individuals – 57% – face 
higher PTRs than before, while under Full Scheme 2, two thirds 
face weaker work incentives, with almost a half of the population 
facing PTRs 25% higher than previously. At the same time, for 
each scheme there are still large numbers of individuals facing 
improved work incentives. It is important to understand how 
these effects are distributed in more detail.  
 
Effects on PTRs by Income Level and Means-Testing Status 
 
In this regard, it is encouraging to see that the work incentive ef-
fects of these schemes, like the distributional consequences, are 
broadly progressive; that is, reductions in PTRs are on average 
larger, and affect larger proportions of the population, among the 
lower income quintiles. 
Under Full Scheme 1, the three poorest income quintiles face 
improved work incentives measured by reductions in PTRs – an 
average reduction of 12% for the poorest quintile, 5% for quintile 
4, and 2% for quintile 3. For the bottom two quintiles, the major-
ity of individuals face improved work incentives – 68% of the 
poorest quintile. In contrast, only 15% of the richest quintile face 
an improvement in their PTR, with an increase, on average, of 
8%. However, even the poorest three quintiles contain a high 
proportion of individuals with weaker work incentives – approxi-
mately a quarter of each face PTRs at least 25% higher than they 
2. The indicators of METRs are likely to understate improvements in work incentives under basic income (Martinelli, 2017b: 
40).
“These averages 
mask a great deal 
of complexity, with 
high proportions of 
‘winners’ and ‘losers’ 
in both schemes”
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previously faced. 
Under Full Scheme 2, the results are still ‘progressive’ but 
only the poorest income quintile faces an average reduction in 
their PTRs (of 8%), with 61% of individuals facing stronger work 
incentives. The remaining quintiles have very high proportions of 
individuals facing significantly weaker work incentives. 
Finally, we turn to the distribution of changes in PTRs by 
household means-testing status. This is perhaps the most 
important distinction since, as described above, the theoreti-
cal grounds for claims that UBI has the potential for activation 
through the elimination of poverty and unemployment traps 
rests on those currently receiving means-tested benefits facing 
reduced PTRs and METRs under a basic income. Indeed, there is 
cause to be optimistic about these potential effects. For both Full 
Scheme 1 and Full Scheme 2, individuals residing in households 
in receipt of at least one means-tested benefit face significantly 
improved work incentives – with PTRs falling by an average of 
17% and 4% respectively. Furthermore, a clear majority of such 
households face improved work incentives, although approxi-
mately a quarter of each face significantly higher PTRs.
Implications for the Desirability and Feasibility of 
Basic Income
Given our theoretical expectations, it is unsurprising that the 
majority of workers would face weaker financial work incentives 
as a result of basic income schemes which require substantially 
increased rates of income tax and the elimination of personal 
allowances and NIC thresholds. What is important about our 
findings is that demographics that are important in the context of 
debates about poverty and unemployment traps – lower income 
groups and those subject to means-testing – do face significantly 
improved work incentives. It is important to understand that this 
is a feature of the replacement of means-tested benefits with a 
non-withdrawable income. As such, although we have not exam-
ined partial schemes directly in the UK context, one implication 
of our work – drawing on the theoretical literature as well as 
findings from modelling in the Finnish context – is that schemes 
which retain a full complement of means-tested benefits are 
likely to be much less desirable with respect to likely effects on 
work incentives and labour market participation. Modelling the 
financial work incentives of such schemes should prove to be a 
fruitful line of enquiry. Nevertheless, we are confident in stating 
that partial schemes are likely to disappoint many basic income 
advocates favouring the policy on the grounds that it would 
activate large numbers into employment. Of course, the predica-
ment is that only such schemes appear remotely feasible based 
on their combined fiscal and distributional implications. 
Much remains uncertain about basic income’s labour market 
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effects. Ultimately, our microsimulation work has focused on one 
among many determinants of labour market participation – the 
financial return to working vis-à-vis inactivity. As the preceding 
literature review demonstrates, this is by no means the only 
factor affecting labour supply decisions, nor necessarily the most 
significant in relation to a reform as fundamental as basic income 
would be. We cannot say much if anything about likely income 
effects, or the impact of detaching labour market conditions 
and sanctions from social security payments. Similarly, we have 
made no attempt here to estimate supply responses to changing 
financial incentives based on imputed labour market elasticities, 
as in Sommer (2016). Applying such methods to UK survey data 
could be another important avenue for future research, although 
it is important to note the limits of the approach (Figari et al., 
2014). 
Ultimately, a full understanding of the issues discussed here 
is probably beyond the scope of the microsimulation approach. 
There are too many complex factors at play to accurately model 
how individuals would respond to a basic income in reality. In this 
regard, the ongoing and forthcoming experiments (discussed 
in Chapter 1) – notwithstanding their failure to conform to the 
definition of basic income in the strictest sense – represent a 
vital opportunity to learn more about basic income’s labour 
market effects.
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In this chapter we close with some thoughts about the prospects 
for UBI and related policy developments in the UK context, 
building on insights from political science and literature on the 
comparative political economy of welfare reform. In a nutshell, 
specific welfare state configurations generate specific patterns 
of winners and losers which respectively oppose and support 
challenges to the status quo in the political realm; welfare 
reforms must necessarily build on existing institutional legacies 
and political economic realities. The success or failure of specific 
policy initiatives such as basic income depends upon the capac-
ity of advocates to construct robust and cohesive coalitions of 
support around specific proposals. 
The UK has a liberal welfare system with longstanding op-
position to generous and universal welfare (Taylor-Gooby, 2004); 
public attitudes have hardened against ‘undeserving’ recipients 
of working age welfare (Pearce and Taylor, 2013; Taylor-Gooby 
and Taylor, 2015). These factors, in combination with trade-offs 
in design features that preclude the simultaneous satisfaction 
of multiple important policy goals in a single UBI scheme, seem 
to caution against the prospects for basic income ‘proper’ being 
introduced into the UK system at all, but particularly the more 
generous schemes. On the other hand, there are some features 
of the UK welfare system that appear to present opportunities 
for moves towards UBI – or at least towards adopting some of 
the core principles and design features of UBI. However, there is 
no guarantee that the introduction of highly partial schemes or 
the adoption of selected features of UBI would lead inexorably 
towards the implementation of more comprehensive forms of 
basic income. 
The discussion proceeds as follows. In the first section of 
Chapter 5 we introduce a generic framework for understand-
ing welfare reform. In the second section we review potential 
sources of support for and opposition to basic income. In the 
final section we provide an overview of the UK system, before 
turning to discussion of the forms that basic income might take 
in the UK, and some reflection on the feasibility of alternative 
trajectories for implementing UBI in sequenced fashion.
An Analytical Framework of Welfare Reform: The 
Role of History and Politics
In the seminal Three Worlds of Welfarepitalism, Esping-Andersen 
(1990) investigated the role of politics and ‘power resources’ 
in the formation and stability of different types of welfare state 
regime. Social-democratic, corporatist and liberal welfare 
‘regimes’ are distinguished, corresponding to Scandinavian, 
continental European and Anglo-Saxon countries respectively. In 
basic terms, each regime has emerged as a result of the specific 
historical context in which actors formed (or were unable to 
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form) broader political coalitions. Schröder (2013: 5) summarises 
concisely:
In Scandinavia, the working class formed a coalition with 
small, capital-intensive and politically well-organized farmers 
and then took the middle class on board by providing high-
quality social services and public jobs. In liberal countries, 
the middle class could largely care for itself in the market, so 
the welfare state became residual, caring only for the poor. 
In continental Europe, labour-intensive large-scale farmers 
were in a coalition with conservatives that isolated the labour 
movement. A state-administered system of welfare benefits 
tied them to the state by protecting them against social risks. 
As Korpi and Palme (2003: 425) put it, “it is fruitful to view 
welfare states as outcomes of, and arenas for, conflicts between 
class-related, socioeconomic interest groups and that in these 
distributive conflicts partisan politics is likely to matter”. 
There is a ‘path-dependent’ logic: the resulting ‘regimes’ or 
configurations regimes are remarkably durable, attributable to 
“institutional legacies, inherited system characteristics, and the 
vested interests that these cultivate” (Esping-Andersen, 1996: 
6). While this ‘path dependency’ does not preclude significant 
reform, it surely limits the extent to which we observe dramatic 
shifts in policy, serving to explain why welfare reforms are 
usually of a ‘piecemeal’ nature; it delimits the nature and direc-
tion of possible reforms; and it helps to explain the persistence 
of institutional diversity across welfare states. The timing and 
sequencing of events is crucially important since ‘policy feed-
back effects’ (Mettler and Sorelle, 2014) can reinforce an existing 
trajectory, leading to stability and the remarkable “persistence of 
diversity” (Bonoli and Palier, 2000); but they can also lead to ten-
sions and contradictions that can trigger debate and generate 
proposals for reform. While it may be the case that ‘piecemeal’, 
evolutionary reform is the norm with respect to welfare policy, 
every now and then there are significant changes in direction – 
‘punctuations’ to longer-term equilibriums (True et al., 2007). In 
either case – stability or change – ‘history matters’. 
At risk of oversimplification, comparative analyses of welfare 
state development point to the congruence of and interaction 
between two main factors:
• The policy and institutional ‘architecture’ of the welfare 
state – including the specifics of policy design features, 
such as social and labour market policies more broadly; 
policy goals; and underlying political-philosophical 
principles. 
• Broader structural (political economy) factors, such 
as sectoral composition; labour market features such 
unemployment, wages, and the nature and extent of 
precarity; the incidence of poverty and inequality; and 
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fiscal dynamics. 
The interplay between political economy factors (and the 
vested interests that they generate) on the one hand, and the 
design and implementation of welfare reforms on the other, 
are mediated by political factors such as the electoral system 
and party political dynamics. In other words, particular forms 
of welfare state emerge as a response to idiosyncratic (country-
specific) manifestations of common socio-economic pressures; 
and in turn, the policies and institutions that are thus formed 
shape the broader structural features of the political economy. 
Thus, the nature and extent of policy reform that we observe 
depends on the characteristics of the welfare state in question 
– the extent to which existing policies and institutions give rise 
to path-dependent processes that reinforce their stability, and 
the extent to which they give rise to tensions and contradictions 
which lead to demand for more radical reform. In both cases, 
the causal mechanisms – through which policy feedback effects 
determine the nature and extent of subsequent reform – involve 
the mobilisation of different constituencies through strategic 
political activity, either in support of the status quo or of alterna-
tive policy solutions.
The Relative Strength of Constituencies For and 
Against Basic Income
In short, if basic income were to be introduced into an existing 
welfare state, it would have to fit with the aforementioned lega-
cies, characteristics, and vested interests of that state; it would 
need to be tailored to the specific nature of policy problems to 
be addressed and the parameters within which policymakers 
are restricted. These factors feed into the nature and relative 
significance of political constituencies that would support, 
oppose, and adopt an ambiguous position in relation to basic 
income. This would, of course, affect the likelihood of any form 
of basic income being introduced at all, as well as the forms of 
basic income that would be most desirable and feasible, and 
the manner in which basic income could (most) feasibly be 
implemented. 
There are basically two ways to conceive of the factors that 
determine whether an individual will support a given political 
cause: in terms of (material) self-interest, and in terms of norma-
tive appeals to justice, irrespective of self-interest. In order to 
become a constituency, a group’s members must have a shared 
interest in a reform that is sufficient to warrant political mobilisa-
tion. What are the prospects for robust constituencies in support 
of basic income on these bases?
There are several constituencies that should, in principle, be 
supportive of UBI on the basis that they would benefit from the 
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policy’s idiosyncratic features. According to Standing (2011), the 
‘precariat’ – a term that encompasses a wide variety of circum-
stances connected by a sense of labour insecurity – forms a 
distinct labour class. If he is right, the precariat indeed comprise 
a broad constituency that would be in favour of basic income. 
But is the precariat a coherent class in the sense of shared inter-
ests, and does it have the capacity to mobilise political resources 
strategically to attain basic income? This is less clear. 
Thinking about the groups that make up the precariat may 
be instructive. Perhaps most obviously, workers with insecure 
employment patterns – whether happy members of the ‘gig 
economy’ or those yearning for a stable permanent job – should 
find a basic income most appealing, since they face highly 
fluctuating incomes. They also have very little hope for adequate 
social protection – both because in systems that are built for 
the default employed/unemployed dichotomy they may fail to 
meet stringent criteria for social assistance, and because they 
may fail to accrue sufficient contributions for social insurance 
benefits. According to Rehm (2016), welfare state preferences 
depend upon an individual’s risk of needing support. In this 
case, those facing labour market precarity can be expected to 
support efforts to make social security more attuned to their 
circumstances and risk profiles. Low-paid and part-time workers 
too should benefit in principle; for them, UBI would top up their 
incomes with minimally imposing administrative requirements. 
Unfortunately, these labour market ‘outsiders’ “tend to lack the 
financial and human resources that make for robust social move-
ments” (Van Parijs and Vanderborght, 2017: 185). 
Following Van Parijs and Vanderborght (ibid.), women are 
another potential constituency of support; to the extent that they 
are involved disproportionately in low-paid and part-time em-
ployment and unpaid care, UBI would “reduce the pro-male bias 
in the distribution of earnings and of social insurance benefits”. 
But as well as not representing all women (in the sense that some 
women do not identify as such or oppose the gendered division 
of labour per se), even the feminist movement is not unambigu-
ously in favour of basic income. Feminist critics (e.g. Gheaus, 
2008) have argued that given women’s already weaker attach-
ment to the labour market, it is women and not men who would 
withdraw from the labour market to do more domestic and care 
work. Thus, an unconditional income paid to men and women 
alike might reinforce existing gender roles, exacerbating issues 
relating to dependence, intra-household inequality, and labour 
market disadvantage. 
Another constituency that might be expected to support UBI 
is people entangled in the current system, who feel the effects 
of its complexity and intrusiveness. But their support might 
ultimately dissolve if they were materially disadvantaged by 
the changes (as many would be in the full schemes analysed in 
Chapter 3) or if the complexity of the system was in fact retained, 
with only marginal increases in payments (as in the partial 
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schemes analysed in Chapter 3). 
In any case, all of these groups are by no means homogenous 
and would not unambiguously support UBI due to self-interest 
alone. Some groups may stand to benefit from a basic income, 
but not sufficiently to warrant political mobilisation. Even the 
least ambiguous constituency with respect to support for basic 
income – workers with insecure employment patterns – include 
groups who would be ‘cross-pressured’ by the proposals, such as 
‘high-skilled outsiders’ (Häusermann et al., 2015) who might cur-
rently rely on precarious employment but also a) earn sufficiently 
large incomes to be discouraged by the higher taxes that UBI 
would imply and b) expect with confidence to attain more secure 
employment in the future. 
Furthermore, the constituencies most vulnerable to ‘new 
social risks’ – and therefore in principle supportive of funda-
mental social security reform along the lines of UBI – also lack 
political power (Bonoli, 2005). The position of trades unions – a 
constituency that has been instrumental in the formation of 
the modern welfare state – is ambiguous; UBI does not neces-
sarily serve the interests of the labour market ‘insiders’ (those 
with stable jobs and secure social security arrangements) that 
comprise trade union memberships, if reforms would erode their 
privileged access to generous social protection (Vanderborght, 
2006; Van Parijs and Vanderborght, 2017). As noted below, 
powerful trade unions that are involved in the administration of 
social insurance funds can exert veto power over reforms that 
are detrimental to their interests and to those of their member-
ship. This suggests that UBI reforms may be especially difficult to 
achieve in social security systems characterised by the dualisa-
tion of labour market protections between labour market insiders 
and outsiders; see Rueda (2007) for analysis of the implications 
of insider-outsider politics, and Palier (2012) on the dualisation of 
welfare provisions in the context of recent European reforms. 
More generally, the tax rises required to fund a UBI at any sig-
nificant level of payment are likely to generate broad opposition 
among the working population, the vast majority of whom would 
face higher marginal rates, even if their overall net tax burden 
might fall. Ultimately, the proportion of households that would 
support a basic income on grounds of self-interest would depend 
upon design features of the specific scheme – in particular the 
levels of payment and accompanying tax reforms. Basic income 
could in principle be designed to be highly progressive and thus 
benefit the majority of the income distribution at the expense 
of the richest in society – generating strong opposition from a 
group with high levels of political mobilisation. This might also 
generate opposition on the grounds of fairness, and based on 
the belief that it is important to maintain strong material incen-
tives for hard work. This connects to a second set of arguments 
about UBI’s political feasibility, related to normative opposition.  
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Party Politics, Coalition Building and Varieties of Basic 
Income 
 
To simplify somewhat, and adapting the framework of Gingrich 
and Ansell (2015), the dynamics of welfare state reform reflect 
the outcomes of electoral competition between parties that 
occupy some point on a right- to left-wing spectrum; as they 
put it, “all parties would like to introduce policy that aligns the 
interests of new voters with those of the party while also deliver-
ing benefits to the base”. UBI does not appear to be a strong 
candidate by these criteria. 
As Van Parijs and Vanderborght (2017: 170-1) observe, “politi-
cal feasibility is intimately linked to ethical justifiability”. Politics 
is guided not only by material interests, but by ideas. And in this 
regard, there are a number of serious normative objections to 
be overcome if UBI is to garner the growth in support required 
to sustain the idea beyond the realm of discussion towards the 
legislative agenda of a ruling government. Torry (2016b) seeks 
to demonstrate that UBI is politically feasible by showing that it 
contains features that appear attractive to adherents of a number 
of contrasting ideological and political-philosophical perspec-
tives. Torry’s claim is analogous to the pronouncement that basic 
income is ‘neither right nor left, but forward’. But this argument 
appears to minimise an equally important claim: that there are 
elements of basic income that are unattractive to the main 
political philosophies. 
Thus, while basic income has supporters across the political 
landscape, it also has detractors – and the large family of basic 
income proposals provides a wide target at which to direct 
criticism. The fact that basic income represents a large family 
of schemes – incorporating residual, libertarian proposals such 
as Murray (2006) as well as generous, progressive schemes – 
enables detractors to criticise the least desirable type of basic 
income (from their particular perspective). Thus, basic income’s 
association with ‘undesirable’ political views permits left-wing 
parties opposed to basic income to speak to their constituencies 
of support (workers, unions, labour market outsiders, and welfare 
recipients) of UBI as a project to dismantle the welfare state. At 
the same time, right-wing parties can play to their support base 
(employers and relatively wealthy individuals) by claiming UBI 
would inflate the role of government in welfare provision and 
dampen incentives for self-provision. 
For parties on the left and right, specific forms of basic 
income might bring in new voters, but they would do so at the 
cost of at least some existing support. This appears to be respon-
sible for the facts that support for basic income mainly emanates 
from minor parties lacking significant prospects of achieving 
office, and that support is often dropped when prospects 
become more realistic: the problem of ‘cheap political support’ 
(De Wispelaere, 2016c). 
The strength of normative opposition and the lack of any 
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coherent, powerful and committed constituency of support – on 
the right or the left – suggests that basic income may require 
the construction of a relatively broad coalition if the idea is to 
gain traction in the political realm. But here again basic income 
runs up against difficulties. UBI advocates across the political 
spectrum have different ideas about key design parameters 
and priority objectives, based on the material interests and 
ideological positions of their target demographics. In terms of 
ideology, support from the ‘opposite’ political side may taint the 
concept of basic income by association: progressives cannot 
get behind a policy supported by right-wingers, and vice versa. 
As De Wispelaere and Noguera (2012: 23) put it: “some instances 
of political support for BI may even be counterproductive as 
support from one particular faction or group may prevent others 
from endorsing the same policy”.
More fundamentally still, satisfying the ‘progressive’ interests 
of traditional supporters of the left (trade unions and workers) 
at the same time as conforming to the ‘market friendly’ prefer-
ences of the right’s base (employers and wealthier voters) may 
be impossible to achieve in a single scheme. Thus, what De 
Wispelaere (2016c) calls the ‘problem of persistent political 
division’ among supporters may exacerbate the political chal-
lenge of building cohesive coalitions around UBI. This division 
can coalesce around a number of issues, including design 
features (payment generosity, interactions with the wider benefit 
system, the fiscal implications of reform, and administrative 
factors1) and the priority goals of policy (for example, whether 
reducing administrative costs, minimising bureaucratic intrusion, 
improving work incentives, improving coverage of risk groups, 
redistribution, improving labour market flexibility, strengthening 
workers’ bargaining positions) – on which political actors have a 
disparity of views. 
The Prospects for a Basic Income in the UK: Design 
Features and Implementation Trajectories
As we have argued, the feasibility of (specific varieties of) basic 
income must be seen as a function of the relative significance 
of political opposition to and support for reform (vis-à-vis the 
existing system) and the extent to which (different forms of) 
1. For example, De Wispelaere and Stirton (2013) note that in practical administrative matters, UBI schemes may differ in 
terms of the extent to which they offer cost savings (by dispensing with entitlement tests), the effectiveness of the processes 
through which intended beneficiaries are identified and ineligible claims are rejected, and the processes through which 
payments are disbursed. Broadly speaking, there will be trade-offs between prioritising the worst-off in society (by ensuring 
payments are substantively and not just nominally universal, and minimising bureaucratic intrusion) and minimising the use 
of bureaucratic resources. “Thus, UBI administration is not simply a matter of addressing the residual technical questions in a 
politically neutral fashion, for the choice of a specific programme design impacts differentially on the set of winners and losers” 
(ibid.: 925). How these issues are navigated will determine the level of political support for specific schemes.
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basic income fit with existing policy and institutional ‘architec-
tures’ and prevailing trajectories of reform. How do these factors 
appear to line up in the case of the UK?
The UK has a liberal welfare state. Social security benefits 
are low level and flat rate, coverage is highly selective on 
means-testing criteria (i.e. benefits only accrue to the poor), and 
entitlement is attached to stringent and punitive labour market 
conditions. In comparison to its mainland European neighbours, 
the political economy of the UK labour market is built around 
labour flexibility and the strength of the service sector. These 
characteristics in combination with labour market policies and 
institutions have resulted in low levels of unemployment, but 
high levels of wage inequality and in-work poverty. The UK’s 
labour market profile thus suggests that the unemployed are 
unlikely to be a significant constituency, at least compared with 
our European neighbours – but that there are a large number 
of working poor who might comprise a constituency for basic 
income. 
A final institutional factor that is encouraging for UK propo-
nents of basic income is the highly integrated labour market 
structure (Gingrich and Ansell, 2015). This contrasts with dualised 
structures in ‘conservative’ European welfare states, in which 
large social insurance funds hold effective vetoes over social 
security reform, and in which the interests of labour market 
‘insiders’ diverge from those of labour market ‘outsiders’, render-
ing progressive coalitions less cohesive. The flipside of this is 
that the UK arguably lacks a coherent constituency of labour 
market outsiders who are disadvantaged with respect to social 
rights and protections (and who might support a basic income 
for that reason). 
According to Larsen (2008), the institutional features of 
welfare systems feed through into public attitudes to welfare. 
Due to the limited coverage of benefits and relatively low levels 
of unemployment, the non-poor majority are more likely to view 
the poor as undeserving and personally responsible for their 
situation (ibid.). Indeed, public support for welfare has declined 
significantly in recent decades, especially for able-bodied claim-
ants who are seen as ‘undeserving’ (Taylor-Gooby and Taylor, 
2015), suggesting that support for unconditionality is currently 
limited. These features of the UK system seem to work against 
solidarity between workers and out-of-work benefit claimants.
One set of intriguing developments is towards benefit homog-
enisation and harmonisation of administrative procedures and 
conditions. These processes are already underway as a result 
of the implementation of Universal Credit (Jordan, 2011; 2012). 
Arguably, the more easily a proposed reform can ‘piggy-back’ 
on the administrative apparatus of the existing system, the less 
costly and disruptive reform is likely to be. More generally, the 
greater the degree of similarity between the existing structure 
of payments and a given reform, the more feasible that reform 
appears to be. In this regard another institutional factor that 
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appears to work in favour of basic income is the UK’s relatively 
generous personal income tax threshold. As suggested by 
Painter (2016), this could easily be repurposed as a universal 
payment that would simply “rectify some of the current distribu-
tional anomalies of personal allowance where those who earn the 
least receive less support”. The possibility of so doing means that 
those designing UBI schemes can conjure up a large proportion 
of the revenue required without ostensible increases in income 
tax rates, which might otherwise be politically unacceptable. It 
is also worthy of note that because UK social security payments 
are funded through general taxation rather than earmarked 
social insurance schemes, the government has more flexibility 
to carry out reform than many continental European countries. 
However, this is not to say that such a move (the repurposing of 
personal tax allowances as benefits) would be straightforward, 
politically speaking. Even if workers were compensated so as 
not to lose out, they might oppose tax increases for ideological 
reasons; indeed, it is politically salient that recent Coalition and 
Conservative tax and welfare reforms have focused on reducing 
tax burdens on low-income households, rather than increasing 
benefit levels (Chrisp, 2017). 
Notwithstanding the institutional similarities between 
Universal Credit and UBI, overarching trends in the recent past 
of UK welfare reform have been towards increasingly stringent 
conditionality. While at first glance it is hard to see how this can 
be rectified with an optimistic view of basic income’s prospects, 
we note that policy feedback effects may act against complex 
and intrusive conditions as more people – including the new 
targets of in-work conditionality under Universal Credit – become 
affected by them. As Griffiths (2017b) writes: “three million 
low-income working households – the very hard working and 
‘just about managing’ families that Theresa May’s government 
is meant to be helping, and who would formerly have remained 
outside the system of behavioural conditionality – will be drawn 
into its unyielding embrace”. The resulting backlash could 
ultimately pave the way for less conditional – and potentially 
even unconditional – systems of state support. 
These factors suggests that, to the extent that any form of 
basic income is politically feasible in the UK, residual schemes 
aimed at reducing poverty and unemployment traps and 
supporting the working poor – as opposed to more generous 
redistributive schemes – are more likely to achieve political 
traction. Coalitions on the right would almost certainly oppose a 
generous UBI which would strengthen the bargaining position of 
labour and necessitate large tax rises, but would be more likely 
to accept one with wage suppression effects accompanied by 
measures designed to increase labour market flexibility.  
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Maximal and Minimal Implementation Trajectories 
 
Advocates often acknowledge that a universal basic income paid 
at a non-trivial level – their preferred option – is not immediately 
politically feasible. For instance, Torry (2013) identifies two 
alternative strategies for implementing UBI, based on his under-
standing of policy reform processes in the UK context. These 
strategies are to provide a basic income for one demographic 
(age) group at a time, and to provide a small unconditional pay-
ment for everyone.  
 
A Small Basic Income for Everyone? 
 
On the face of it, the argument for either of these strategies 
seems persuasive. But on closer inspection, the option of paying 
everyone a very small basic income is less appealing. A full basic 
income – with all the benefits that might come with it – is a hard 
political sell, and does not look very likely in current circum-
stances. Pursuing an interim option may not be as desirable, but 
will bring some of UBI’s benefits. It will be politically more palat-
able – costing much less in fiscal terms – and will fit more easily 
into existing institutions and administrative procedures, since it 
will not require major upheavals. 
However, such a strategy is not without danger. It is not 
clear that partial models will give rise to full complement of 
advantages on which basic income is sold. There may be admin-
istrative savings arising from the elimination of means-tested or 
other benefits that are functionally replaced by a basic income. 
Thus we concur with De Wispelaere and Stirton’s (2016: 302) 
conclusion that “a basic income pitched around the poverty line 
may accrue important administrative savings that are not present 
when the level of basic income is substantially less: in that case, 
other means-tested programmes will pick up the slack, with all 
attendant administration remaining firmly in place”. Indeed, 
partial schemes – such as those in which means-tested benefits 
and their associated administrative systems are retained – may 
represent the worst of both worlds: UBI may be unable to ‘pig-
gyback’ on existing systems and institutions, requiring brand 
new ones operating alongside those that already exist. In such 
a situation, UBI could represent greater rather than reduced 
administrative complexity and cost. 
Against this, partial schemes clearly balance the goals of 
controlling fiscal expenditure and ensuring the minimisation of 
adverse distributional consequences more effectively, as dis-
cussed in Chapter 3. On balance, the curtailment of fiscal costs 
– in conjunction with the minimisation of large household losses 
– appears much more likely to affect the political feasibility of 
proposals, since they represent a much larger proportion of the 
policy’s total costs. If a basic income were to be implemented in 
the UK with universal coverage and non-trivial levels of payment, 
it would almost certainly be of the types analysed in Chapter 3 
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as partial schemes. But it is also worth noting that such a form of 
UBI would have limited appeal to proponents whose priorities are 
to reduce bureaucratic complexity and reduce high withdrawal 
rates, thus reducing the prospects of a broad coalition in its 
favour. To an even greater degree, a UBI pitched at a much less 
significant level is likely to be challenged as a waste of time and 
political capital, given that even very small payments would still 
involve spending billions of pounds of scarce fiscal resources on 
rich and poor alike. This appears improbable in a political climate 
in which Child Benefit has recently been subjected to means-
testing for the first time.  
 
A Basic Income for Specific Age Groups? 
 
Torry (2016b) models the effects of two possible schemes aimed 
at children and young adults respectively. As Torry observes, the 
former option may be relatively acceptable to the electorate to 
the extent that “children are universally regarded as a deserving 
demographic group” (p. 80). Indeed, until recently the exist-
ing Child Benefit system conformed closely to the principle of 
universality, and there is already an appropriate administrative 
structure in place. In addition, because the payments would 
simply pay existing recipients of Child Benefit a more generous 
(£40) and truly universal payment, fiscal costs would be fairly 
minimal (compared to schemes with comprehensive coverage of 
the population). However, even such a modest effort would still 
require a 2% increase in NICs above the upper earnings thresh-
old, and a 2.5% rise in income tax rates across all tax bands. 
According to Torry (ibid.: 79), such a scheme would reduce child 
poverty levels by about 10%. The UBI for young adults (aged 
16-24) would be paid for almost entirely through the removal of 
the personal income tax threshold for that age group, as well 
as a 4% increase in NICs above the upper earnings limit. Torry 
argues that it would be feasible to extend coverage gradually by 
continuing to pay recipients the basic income beyond age 19, 
while those to whom coverage had not yet been extended – for 
reasons of fairness – would retain their personal allowance. While 
we accept the principle behind Torry’s reasoning, it is unclear 
how feasible or desirable it would be to maintain a dual tax 
system, administratively speaking. 
In Martinelli (2017a), we have also examined a number of 
options for introducing a basic income for specific age groups. 
These include a Young Adult’s Income for 18-25 year olds, a Third 
Age Income for individuals aged between 50 and pension age, 
and a Citizen’s Pension. In each of the Young Adult’s Income and 
Third Age Income, we withdraw the main working age benefits 
(ESA, IS, and JSA) alongside a UBI of equivalent value to basic 
payment rates; the schemes imply net costs of £23bn and £37bn 
respectively. Both schemes imply reductions in household pov-
erty of around 8%, with the Young Adult’s Income significantly 
more effective at alleviating child poverty and – at a lower cost 
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– ‘better value’ overall. 
Probably the most feasible route for introducing a basic 
income to a specific group is via a universal Citizen’s Pension. 
The current system has for some time been moving towards 
universality through incremental changes to the contributory 
principle, including a reduction in the number of years required 
to qualify for a full Basic State Pension (BSP) and the introduction 
of Home Responsibilities Protection (subsequently replaced by 
National Insurance credits for parents and carers). The recent 
moves to a more generous, single-tier BSP are intended to 
reduce the role of means-testing in the pension system, by 
increasing the value of the full BSP to the minimum income 
threshold implied by the means-tested Pension Credit. In other 
words, the UK state pension system is already quite close to a 
universal flat-rate payment in practice, although it technically 
remains a contributory benefit with complex entitlement rules. 
Replacing the BSP and Pension Credit with a Citizen’s Pension 
of equivalent value would cost around £24bn, and would have 
fairly minimal effects on poverty levels, according to our micro-
simulation results (Martinelli, 2017a). Despite the underwhelming 
distributional benefits, it is worth noting that reform would 
probably bring substantial administrative savings, as complex 
means- and contributions tests would no longer be required. 
Another important factor is that pensioners are broadly consid-
ered to be more ‘deserving’ than working-age welfare claimants, 
as well as comprising a disproportionately powerful electoral 
constituency (Berry, 2014).  
 
Towards the Adoption of Basic Income Principles 
 
In a similar vein to Torry’s (2013) minimal strategy, although 
diverging from strict concept of basic income, Van Parijs (2004) 
suggests that as a practical strategic matter, UBI advocates must 
keep ‘one eye in the distance, and one on the floor’. For him, 
cognate schemes such as EITCs are realistic starting points on 
which longer term efforts can build. In the UK, where in-work 
benefits are already in situ, a plausible direction of reform might 
be to reverse cuts to the generosity of in-work benefits that are 
impoverishing working families and simultaneously deteriorating 
their financial incentives to work (Resolution Foundation, 2016). 
To these we might add attempts to reduce the punitive nature 
of behavioural conditions, or broaden their scope to include 
forms of valuable non-labour market activities, perhaps towards 
the formal introduction of a participation income. One possibil-
ity for incremental reform rests in the powers of the devolved 
parliaments and regional authorities. As we have already noted, 
there is some appetite for trialling basic income in the Scottish 
cities of Glasgow and Fyfe. Although Westminster currently sets 
benefit levels and entitlement rules, nevertheless there may be 
scope in the future for regional- and local-level experimenta-
tion – for example with respect to conditionality and sanctions 
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regimes imposed on claimants. Ultimately, steps that fall short of 
basic income per se may fail to achieve any significant progress 
towards many of UBI’s goals, and may even be counterproductive 
to the attainment of some of them (for example, by requiring an 
additional layer of administration, and thus increasing the costs 
of bureaucracy). It is also conceivable that some of these efforts 
would effectively erode the impetus for more significant reforms; 
for example, it seems evident that the harsher and more dysfunc-
tional elements of conditionality are instrumental in generating 
support for basic income. So the argument goes, the danger is 
that in pushing for incremental improvements ‘the good’ (reign-
ing in the excesses of conditionality) may be the enemy of ‘the 
best’ (an unconditional basic income). 
We reject this view. Supporters of basic income should be 
motivated by a desire to improve lives, not by slavish devotion 
to an abstract idea. If it happens that elements of basic income 
can be actualised more readily in part than in totality, then we 
must accept this political reality. As Van Parijs (ibid.: 24) aptly 
notes, “the fight for basic income is not an all-or-nothing affair. 
This is no game for purists and fetishists but for tinkerers and 
opportunists”. 
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Appendix I: UBI in Three Influential Political 
Philosophical Perspectives
Libertarianism
As Van Parijs (1992) documents in the introduction to his seminal 
volume Arguing for Basic Income: Ethical Foundations for a Radical 
Reform, UBI can be strongly justified on the basis of alterna-
tive theories of justice. In libertarian accounts, redistributive 
measures funded through taxation are generally opposed on the 
grounds that individuals should be free to own and dispose of 
their (justly acquired) private property as they see fit; the more 
functional corollary of this ethical claim is that free markets in-
centivise self-provision and therefore lead to greater productive 
efficiency. However, a UBI is consistent with libertarian thought 
on the basis that every individual within a political community 
has an equal right to commonly-owned natural resources and, 
furthermore, to compensation for the private ownership of such 
resources to the extent that privatisation may be understood 
to have arisen from historical injustice (ibid.; Carter, 2012). An 
extension to this argument holds that all output is the product 
of “a complex interaction between natural resources, inherited 
technology, the legal and customary framework and particular 
capital and labour inputs” (Van Parijs, 1996: 17), some of which 
(excepting labour and justly-acquired capital) should rightly be 
seen as social assets. To the extent that this is true, these factors 
are subject to the same arguments regarding individuals’ right to 
compensation for their private appropriation. However, this is still 
likely to be a fairly small proportion of output – given that labour 
and capital contribute the majority of value added – as well as 
practically impossible to determine.  
 
Egalitarianism 
 
Thus, the libertarian justification for UBI is forceful – particularly 
in conjunction with arguments that it should be funded directly 
through resource revenue – but as Van Parijs (1991: 15-16) ac-
knowledges, at most it pertains to “an admittedly strong right to 
a pathetically small grant”. In order to justify a more expansive 
UBI, we need also to consider arguments which posit a broader 
concept of freedom – ‘real freedom’ – than libertarian accounts.
All egalitarian thought begins from the idea that something of 
normative value – for example resources, welfare, opportunity, 
or ‘real freedom’ – should be equalised across the population 
(Dworkin, 1981a; 1981b). The difficulty for egalitarian advocates of 
UBI is that although a uniform payment to all satisfies the criteria 
of equality in a narrow ‘procedural’ sense – by conferring every 
individual an identical entitlement to income transfer – it appears 
to fail to uphold more complex forms of equality that imply that 
difference should be treated with difference. These may require, 
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for example, that entitlement to state transfers (and their level) 
should be varied according to individuals’ diverse gross income 
levels and specific needs. In the case of the former (diverse 
gross income levels), UBI appears inegalitarian as uniform 
transfers would not equalise net incomes (and therefore access 
to resources) as effectively as targeted transfers. In the case of 
the latter, even if UBI were an effective means of redistributing 
income and therefore promoting greater equality of resources – 
as is claimed, for example due to improved ‘target efficiency’ and 
the removal of poverty and unemployment traps that dispropor-
tionately affect the poor, as discussed below – it does not follow 
that UBI would be an effective means to equalise welfare or 
opportunity, since those with more extensive needs (for exam-
ple arising from disability) would be disadvantaged. Furthermore, 
egalitarianism is usually concerned with equalising individuals’ 
opportunities to attain a given level of income or welfare in the 
context of “undeserved bad luck – being born with poor native 
endowments, bad parents, and disagreeable personalities, 
suffering from accidents and illness, and so forth” (Anderson, 
1999) – but acknowledges that work effort should be recognised 
and rewarded. It is therefore consistent with the conception of 
equality which considers that resources and welfare should vary 
in proportion to ‘deserts’; this idea appears to conflict with UBI’s 
unconditional (and non-reciprocal) character. 
Despite these objections, there is still a compelling egalitarian 
case for UBI, as typified by Guy Standing’s (2002) Beyond the New 
Paternalism: Basic Security as Equality. A good point of departure 
in constructing this argument is Rawls’ (1971) influential A Theory 
of Justice. Rawls has persuasively argued that deviations from 
equality are just if they serve to improve the position of the worst 
off. Standing adopts a modified version of this criterion, demon-
strating that UBI improves the security of – and does not impose 
paternalistic control on or exercise bureaucratic discretion 
over – the poorest and ‘least free’ in society. It should be added 
that the egalitarian defence of UBI only appears to hold when 
it is implemented in conjunction with and not as an alternative 
to a range of targeted benefits. Following Baker (1992), it would 
also require a system for compensating differentials with respect 
to work effort and desert; indeed, this would be necessary to 
sustain the UBI – funded as it would be via productive activity 
capable of generating a ‘social surplus’ – as well as for reasons of 
egalitarian justice.  
 
Communitarianism  
 
The justifications provided above may be characterised as ‘liberal 
individualist’, in the sense that they take the liberty, welfare and 
rights of individuals as their primary concern. For communitar-
ians – who take society as a whole as their preferred unit of 
analysis – maximising the aggregate of welfare at the individual 
level may not be best for societal welfare (Bell, 2016). As Bell 
“Egalitarianism is 
usually concerned 
with equalising 
individuals’ 
opportunities to 
attain a given level 
of income or welfare 
in the context of 
undeserved bad luck”
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(ibid.) acknowledges, the communitarian critique of liberalism 
was “motivated not so much by philosophical concerns as by 
certain pressing political concerns, namely, the negative social 
and psychological effects related to the atomistic tendencies 
of modern liberal societies”. According to Pearce (2015), com-
munitarians are distrustful of UBI precisely because it carries 
with it the potential to weaken collective and civic institutions 
and social bonds: it is seen to (further) diminish the concept of 
reciprocity on which social security has traditionally been based, 
and – whether warranted or not – it has become connected to 
conservative agendas of welfare spending cuts, ‘laissez-faire’ 
labour market policies, and the erosion and privatisation of 
public services. 
The implications of this critique are quite profound, and cer-
tainly seriously limit the political feasibility of UBI – for although 
the political philosophical concept of communitarianism may 
be fairly unfamiliar to the layperson, the ideas it conveys are not. 
Across the left-right spectrum, we encounter the widespread 
perception that ‘fairness’ requires that rights are coupled with 
responsibilities, perhaps the most important of which is the 
responsibility of those who are able to work. 
Does this mean that communitarians are immutably opposed 
to UBI? Not necessarily; for a number of UBI proponents, the 
principles underlying UBI are not at all incompatible with a 
desire to foster communal life and to promote a more cohesive 
and harmonious society (e.g. Santens, 2015). For one thing, UBI 
would reduce people’s dependence on wage labour, permitting 
them to devote more time to civic responsibilities. As Van Parijs 
(2004) has observed, the individualised nature of UBI should help 
to reduce isolation traps (which occur due to the imposition of 
household-level means-tests and conditions) and thus promote 
family formation. And most basic income advocates oppose the 
vision of UBI as an alternative to the provision of public services, 
where these are justified by other distinct rationales.
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